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ABSTRACT 
 Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, approximately 660 ethnic 
Albanians from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia have joined Islamic jihadist 
groups, including ISIS. In 2014, these governments began conducting counterterrorism 
operations to disrupt recruitment networks. These efforts, however, devoted fewer 
resources to addressing the underlying social and religious aspects of the foreign fighter 
phenomena. This thesis studies the factors that have contributed to radicalization of 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia. It applies a radicalization 
model to study three groups of variables: socio-economic conditions, Islamic charities 
and non-governmental organizations, social connections, and online propaganda as 
potential sources of radicalization of Albanian foreign fighters. The thesis finds that no 
single overarching factor can fully account for the ideological and violent radicalization 
of ethnic Albanians in the region. The role of Persian Gulf State charities and 
foreign-trained Salafi clerics are two particularly strong variables that have led to the 
foreign fighter problem in the three countries studied. Given these findings, the thesis 
concludes by recommending a greater partnership between governments, official 
religious associations, and civil society by focusing counter-radicalization efforts at the 
community level and prioritizing communities that are at risk for radicalization and 
violent behavior. 
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A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, approximately 150 citizens from 
Albania, 358 from Kosovo, and 156 from North Macedonia have traveled to Syria and 
Iraq to participate in Islamic Jihad. Initially, these foreign fighters aligned with various 
anti-Assad regime groups. After the declaration of the caliphate in 2014, however, most 
of these fighters joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and have continued to 
fight on its behalf. Faced with relatively high numbers of citizens joining ISIS, and 
following external pressure from the international community, Albania, Kosovo, and 
North Macedonia have started to adopt, implement, and improve counterterrorism laws 
and security measures aimed at managing the “foreign fighter” problem in their countries.  
More specifically, from 2014 to 2015, the respective governments of the three 
countries began conducting counterterrorism operations to foil radicalization and 
recruitment networks responsible for supplying foreign fighters to ISIS. Albania, Kosovo, 
and North Macedonia have used laws, the judicial system, and deterrence through 
criminal justice to prosecute those that participate in and support terrorist activities. 
Nonetheless, this option only treats the symptoms of radicalization. The core issue is how 
to address radical ideologies that “[create or form] belief systems which justify the use of 
violence to effect social change and come to actively support as well as employ violent 
means for political purposes.”1 An effective analysis of the factors that encourage ethnic 
Albanians to embrace radical Islam ideology is a first and crucial step to understanding 
the phenomenon, and can ultimately facilitate the development and implementation of 
effective strategies and plans of action to prevent and counter violent extremism at the 
national and regional levels.  
1Asta Maskaliūnaitė, “Exploring the Theories of Radicalization,” Interdisciplinary Political and 
Cultural Journal, 17, no. 1 (2015): 9. DOI10.1515/ipcj-2015-0002 
2 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project explores the following question: What are the causal factors that have 
influenced ethnic Albanians to become radicalized, embrace militant Islamic ideologies, 
and join violent extremist organizations, such as ISIS? To answer this question, the thesis 
looks at political, economic, social, ethnic, and religious factors in Albania, Kosovo, and 
North Macedonia.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
Understanding the causes of radicalization in general and violent radicalization in 
particular requires a detailed analysis that covers both the breadth and depth of possible 
root causes. These root causes are often “complex, multifaceted and often intertwined.”2 
To investigate these complex factors, this thesis uses a controlled case study comparison 
to unravel the sources of radicalization. Political scientist Arend Lijphart, in 
“Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” observes that “interpretive case 
studies are selected for analysis because of an interest in the case rather than an interest in 
formulation of general theory…. [However,] they make explicit use of established 
theoretical propositions.”3 With this in mind, this thesis also draws from existing theories 
to structure the analysis and comparison of the case studies. 
Specifically, this thesis draws on three theories to construct an analytical 
framework: Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), Social Movement Theory (SMT), and 
Religious Fundamentalism Theory (RFT). These three theories provide the foundations 
for examining the causes of Islamic radicalization in general and violent radicalization in 
particular among ethnic Albanians.  
This thesis scopes the analysis into three interpretive, descriptive case studies of 
ethnic Albanians residing in Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia. In this context, to 
understand radicalization in general and violent radicalization in particular, political, 
2Ömer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor 
Redefined,” SAIS Review, vol. XXIX, no.2 (2009):76.  
3Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science 
Review, 65, no. 3 (1971): 691, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1955513.  
3 
social, economic, and religious factors are explored and used to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of why some ethnic Albanians have radicalized and decided to join violent 
extremist groups, such as ISIS.  
Ultimately, this thesis aims to consider the factors that have led to Islamic 
radicalization and how this radicalization has led to violent action in particular as a 
phenomenon that is visible among ethnic Albanians as a single group dispersed across 
three countries of residence: Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia. This approach 
provides a better insight into the issue of Islamic radicalization broadly for this ethnic 
group and how the governments of Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia can better 
develop and implement national strategies for preventing and countering violent 
extremism. For country data and evidence, this project uses journal articles, government 
reports, databases, policy papers, research articles, and online information from various 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGO). 
D. FINDINGS  
The thesis finds that Albanian foreign fighters from the three countries studied 
come from a mixture of socio-economic backgrounds, age groups, genders, and areas 
within their countries, and many have ties to friends and family members that have 
already joined ISIS. Therefore, no single factor fully explains the path to violent 
radicalization and the decision of some ethnic Albanians to join ISIS.  
Nevertheless, the investigation does point to some possible causal factors of 
radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters from Kosovo, Albania, and North 
Macedonia. First, the inability of governments to address socio-economic grievances, 
coupled with regional and local episodes of war and violence, including the violent 
outbreak in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, have provided opportunities for various Islamic 
charities and NGOs from Persian Gulf countries to gain a foothold in the Balkans, 
including in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Some of these charities, such as the 
Al-Haramain and Muwafaq foundations, under the guise of providing humanitarian 
assistance, have conducted terrorist activities, including money laundering, harboring 
jihadi militants from the Middle East, and planning terrorist attacks against critical targets 
4 
in the region. Aside from these nefarious NGOs, virtually all of the charities and NGOs 
from the Persian Gulf have introduced jihadi Salafism to the region alongside providing 
much necessary social and economic support to areas and communities in need. They 
have sponsored infrastructure building, education, and other social services within 
communities where governments have failed to effectively address socio-economic 
grievances. Critically, these charities have facilitated the proliferation of radical 
interpretations of Islam, especially Salafism. 
Second, and more importantly, these charities have provided scholarships for 
young Albanians to attend theological universities in Arab countries, including Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. Upon return, most of these young clerics have continued to proliferate 
a foreign and radical interpretation of Islam, contrary to traditional Islamic values and 
practices of the Balkans. Some clerics have adopted jihadist Salafism and have played a 
key role in radicalizing and recruiting a significant portion of the 650 ethnic Albanian 
foreign fighters originating from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia.  
Third, personal relationships, such as family and friends, have also influenced 
individuals to join ISIS. Instances of families and friends traveling together as a group to 
join ISIS are evident across the three countries. Kosovo has had the largest number of 
foreign fighters traveling as a family, including siblings, women, and children.  
Finally, the thesis identifies four broad ISIS propaganda narratives presented in 
the Albanian language: 1) the establishment of the caliphate and its implementation of 
full sharia law; 2) the religious obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah 
(emigration), as well as the mandate to conduct jihad and achieve eternal salvation 
through martyrdom; 3) the perception that Muslims are under attack from the West; and 
4) the appeal of jihadist adventure and brotherhood. While more work needs to be done 
on the role that ISIS propaganda has played in recruiting Albanian foreign fighters, these 
generic terms provide an important foundation upon which local imams may have 
radicalized fellow congregants.  
5 
E. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ALBANIANS IN THE BALKANS 
To better understand how ethnic Albanians came to be dispersed across several 
states in the Balkans, it is important to provide a brief historical overview of the region. 
While this discussion could easily require the length of a book, this section focuses rather 
on a few key events that created the modern-day states in the Balkans and some of the 
region’s ethnic tensions.  
The first important event that shaped the modern-day Balkans is what is known as 
the Great Eastern Crisis.4  This crisis, also referred to as the 1875–1878 Balkan crisis, 
involved a series of wars between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Leagueinitially 
formed by Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, and joined later by Russia in 1877. 
Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire lost this conflict, and the crisis ended with the short-
lived treaty of San Stefano, which was signed on 3 March 1878.5 According to the treaty, 
Bulgaria gained extensive territories including today’s Macedonia, regions of northern 
Greece (Thracia), and eastern territories of present-day Albania. Serbia gained 
independence and stretched into the northern areas of current day Kosovo, including 
Mitrovica and Pristina. Montenegro, similarly, gained independence and occupied 
majority ethnic Albanian regions in western Kosovo and north-western Albania.6 In 
response to the treaty, Albanian nationalists formed the League of Prizren on 10 June 
1878 with the aim of uniting all Albanians, politically and militarily, in order to regain 
lost territory and prevent further partitioning of Albanian lands among its neighbors.7  
At the same time, on 13 June 1878, Austro-Hungary, Germany, France, Britain, 
and Italy convened in Berlin to reverse the territorial changes implemented by the treaty 
of San Stefano because the great European Powers feared an increase in Russian 
                                                 
4Leslie Rogne Schumacher, “The Eastern Question as a Europe Question: Viewing the Ascent of 
‘Europe’ through the Lens of Ottoman Decline,” Journal of European Studies 44, no. 1 (2014):65–66, DOI: 
10.1177/0047244113508363.  
5Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), 43. 
6Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 42–43. 
7Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 44. 
6 
influence in the Balkans, mainly through the enlargement of Bulgaria, Serbia, and 
Montenegro. On 13 July 1878, through the Treaty of Berlin, these powers compelled 
Russia to accept a new peace agreement and return most of the territories to the Ottoman 
Empire, especially land gained by Bulgaria and Serbia.8 The Ottomans, however, lost 
Bosnia-Hercegovina to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and Montenegro retained some 
of Albania’s territories, despite efforts by the Albanian League to lobby the Berlin 
congress to recognize Albania’s claims to autonomy. In the end, the main purpose of the 
Treaty of Berlin was to reduce Russian influence in Bulgaria, keep the Ottoman Empire 
in Europe by giving it full control of Albanian and Macedonian territories, and prevent 
Serbia from growing stronger.9  
Albanians’ aspirations for a unified nation that included all Albanian territory 
received a major blow in 1908, when the Young Turks came to power by overthrowing 
the Ottoman Sultan and establishing a constitutional government.10 Many Albanian elites 
hoped that, by supporting the Young Turks, they would achieve their national aspirations 
of a full autonomous Albanian state. However, the Young Turks did not deliver on 
promises of full autonomy and Albanian dreams of independence were eventually 
undermined by regional powers. In 1912, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria 
formed another Balkan League to completely drive the Ottomans from the Balkans in 
what became known as the First Balkan War. Albanians sided with the Ottomans to 
receive military aid and help in confronting the Serb and Montenegrin armies in the 
North, Bulgarian and Macedonian forces in the East, and Greek forces in the South. By 
the end of 1912, allied Greek and Serbian troops confronted Ottoman forces and defeated 
them. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy supported Albanian elites in their declaration of 
independence on 28 November 1912, at the Congress of Vlore.  
The conference of ambassadors, convened in London in December 1912, 
recognized Albanian independence, but about half of the territories with ethnic Albanian 
                                                 
8Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 44.  
9Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 45. 
10Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Young Turks: Turkish Nationalist Movement,” accessed 15 February 
2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Young-Turks-Turkish-nationalist-movement.  
7 
populations were left outside the newly formed Albanian state, including Kosovo and 
western parts of Macedonia. These territories were annexed by Serbia. Greece received 
the southern Albanian region that Albanians called Çameria, and Montenegro maintained 
territories received from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and some territories in western 
Kosovo.11  
Kosovo remained part of Serbia, first under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes that was formed in December 1918, and renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 
1929,12 later part of Communist Yugoslavia that was created in 1946, and finally part of 
Serbia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s (NATO) intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 eventually opened 
the road for Kosovo’s independence on 17 February 2008.13  
During these various periods, the central Serb government brought Serbian 
settlers to Kosovo, attempted to assimilate ethnic Albanians by not allowing the Albanian 
language to be taught in Kosovo, and instituted forced migration that drove many 
Kosovar Albanians and ethnic Turks to Turkey, particularly between 1918 and 1941.14 
Again, after Slobodan Milosevic came to power in 1987, the Serbian Government 
enacted repressive measures against Kosovo Albanians that culminated with the 1998–
1999 atrocities that warranted NATO’s intervention to prevent further ethnic cleansing of 
Kosovo Albanians.15  
                                                 
11Dick Zandee and Dick A. Leurdijk, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis (New York: Routledge, 2018), 
10–11. 
12Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes: Historical Kingdom, 
Balkans [1918–1929],” accessed 15 February 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Kingdom-of-Serbs-
Croats-and-Slovenes.  
13Albert Rohan, “Kosovo’s Path to Independence,” European Council on Foreign Relations, last 
updated 2 February 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_kosovos_path_to_independence.  
14Zandee and Leurdijk, Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis, 13–14. 
15Zandee and Leurdijk, Kosovo:From Crisis to Crisis, 19–25. 
8 
At the end of World War II, Macedonia was declared the People’s Republic of 
Macedonia and became part of the Yugoslav federation.16 Following this, in 1948, 
Macedonia was 68.5 % ethnic Macedonians, 17% ethnic Albanians, and around 8.3% 
ethnic Turks.17 On 8 September 1991, Macedonia declared independence from the 
Yugoslav Federation without violence, unlike neighboring Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Hercegovina, which all went to war against Serbia between 1991 and 1995 in the Wars of 
Yugoslav Secession.18 Since then, however, the stability and integrity of Macedonia has 
been threatened in the domestic and regional arenas.19 At the regional level, Macedonia’s 
neighbors, especially Greece and Bulgaria, did not accept a “Macedonian Nation” or 
“Macedonian State,” a dispute that dates back to the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and 
World War II.20 In 2019, after intense pressure from Greece, Macedonia officially 
changed its name to North Macedonia.21   
Disputes over Macedonian statehood had considerable effects on the country’s 
domestic politics and interethnic relations during the early years of independence. As of 
1994, ethnic Macedonians constituted 66.5% of the population, whereas ethnic Albanians 
made up 22.9% of the population, Turks 4%, Roma 2.3%, Serbs 2%, Vlachs 0.04%, and 
other minorities comprised the remaining 2.26% of the population, including Bosnians, 
Croatians, and Bulgarians.22 Given the multiethnic nature of society in Macedonia, 
attempts to strengthen the Macedonian state and nation have proven challenging. The 
1991 Constitution declared that “[…] Macedonia is established as a National state of the 
                                                 
16Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28. 
17Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and Macedonians: A History (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2008), 256. 
18Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 142. 
19Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 12. 
20Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict, 28. 
21Stephanie Halasz et al., “Macedonia officially changes name to North Macedonia, drawing line under 
bitter dispute,” CNN, last updated 13 February 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/13/europe/north-
macedonia-name-change-intl/index.html.  
22Rossos, Macedonia and Macedonians, 8. 
9 
Macedonian people, which guarantees the full civic equality and permanent coexistence 
of the Macedonian people with the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romas and other 
nationalities.”23 Furthermore, the North Macedonian Constitution also created a strong 
central government and redrew municipal borders. Ethnic Albanians did not accept this 
constitutional arrangement that reduced political status of non-Macedonian nationalities 
to minorities and a reduction of political power at the national level.24 These political 
grievances added to the pre-1991 socio-economic discrimination of minorities, including 
ethnic Albanians, and the inability of the political system to address the wide range of 
grievances led to the five-month-long ethnic Albanian uprising in 2001.25  
The United States and the European Union helped broker a ceasefire between 
ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government through the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (OFA), which was signed on 8 August 2001.26 The agreement laid the 
groundwork for addressing the political demands of ethnic Albanians, and major changes 
were made to the 1991 Constitution, including decentralization of power to 
municipalities. Furthermore, laws were enacted to ensure equitable representation and 
greater ethnic minority rights in public administration, education, healthcare, and 
employment, particularly for ethnic Albanians.27  
Nonetheless, the 2001 conflict increased distrust between ethnic Macedonians and 
ethnic Albanians in general. This distrust has shaped and aligned internal politics and 
social life along ethnic identities and has produced more divisive rather than inclusive 
state building efforts. Additionally, ethnic Macedonians view the Albanian state as 
having a role in influencing separatist demands of the more radical elements within the 
                                                 
23Armend Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia,” 
Human Rights Review 9, no. 1 (2008):57, DOI 10.1007/s12142-007-0029-z. 
24Aisling Lyon, “Decentralization and the Management of Ethnic Conflict: A Case Study of the 
Republic of Macedonia” (PhD diss., University of Bradford, 2012), 52–53, http://hdl.handle.net/10454/
5693.  
25Lyon, “Decentralization and the Management of Ethnic Conflict,” 55–56. 
26Rossos, Macedonia and Macedonians, 280; Lyon, “Decentralization and the Management of Ethnic 
Conflict,” 68–69. 
27Rossos, Macedonia and Macedonians, 280. 
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ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. These views emerged during World War II, when the 
Albanian puppet government attempted to align non-communist Albanian support for the 
Axis Powers in the Balkans, including those in Macedonia.28 Yet, Albania, unlike 
Bulgaria and Greece, recognized Macedonia’s independence with no reservations in 
1991.29 Furthermore, post-1991 internal political and social challenges prevented 
Albania from getting involved directly in Macedonia’s domestic troubles.30  
The Albanian state itself has also faced considerable challenges in the 20th 
century. From 1944 to 1985 under the leadership of Enver Hoxha, Albania endured the 
most repressive communist regime in the region.31 Strictly enforcing a Stalinist ideology, 
Enver Hoxha broke ties with the Soviet Union in 1960, which had initiated a 
destalinization program under Nikita Khrushchev. The regime instead aligned with China 
until 1978, when Enver Hoxha severed ties with the Chinese over their economic 
reforms, which Hoxha considered to be capitalist in nature.32 With the Chinese gone, the 
regime lost its last source of foreign aid and turned toward self-reliance and autarky.33  
After the fall of communism in 1991, Albania entered “a rocky road” to “a 
pluralistic democracy and a market economy.”34 The country inherited a devastated 
economic and social welfare system. Foreign aid that followed during the early years of 
pluralism helped the Albanian democratic government to improve Albania’s economy 
and consolidate democratic institutions.35 However, positive economic growth and socio-
political order were disrupted by the 1997 breakdown of fraudulent “pyramid investment 
                                                 
28Lyon, “Decentralization and the Management of Ethnic Conflict,” 72; Elez Biberaj, Albania in 
Transition; The Rocky Road to Democracy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), 19. 
29International Crisis Group, Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict, (Skopje: ICG, 
21 October 1997), 3, https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/world/europe/south_east_europe/macedonia/
MacedoniaPoliticsofEthnicityandConflict.pdf.  
30Lyon, “Decentralization and the Management of Ethnic Conflict,” 71. 
31Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 22. 
32Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 24–26. 
33Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 26, 72. 
34Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 148. 
35Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 188–189.  
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schemes” that began in 1991.36 A study on this issue estimates that, by 1996, these 
schemes accounted for total deposits equivalent to half of Albania’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) at that time.37 With some of these companies offering as much as a 50% 
return on investment, many Albanians sold their houses and properties to benefit from the 
schemes. By the end of 1996, however, some of these companies could not make 
payments and declared bankruptcy. Aggrieved from having lost their lifetimes’ savings 
and investments, Albanian citizens took to the streets in various cities throughout the 
country, eventually leading to an armed revolt that lasted for almost five months.  
The UN Security Council, under Resolution 1101, authorized an Italian-led 
multinational humanitarian mission that aided in the restoration of law and order.38 By 
the summer of 1997 a new government was elected and seated. However, the 1997 civil 
war damaged Albania’s progress in economic development and democratization, in 
addition to weakening its position in the region. This was especially true of its ability to 
negotiate with its neighbors in regard to demanding more rights for Kosovo Albanians 
and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.39  
The previous discussion does not provide a detailed historical, political, or socio-
economic account of ethnic Albanians living in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. 
Yet, this brief summary offers highlights of critical moments and context that will help 
facilitate an understanding of the political, social, and economic factors that may have 
contributed to the emergence of religious radicalization in general and violent 
radicalization in particular.  
F. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows:  Chapter II begins with a literature review of the 
causes of social grievances broadly, and the conditions under which people adopt radical 
                                                 
36Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 202. 
37James P. Korovilas, “The Albanian Economy in Transition: The Role of Remittances and Pyramid 
Investment Schemes,” Post-Communist Economies 11, no. 3 (1999):409, DOI: 10.1080/14631379995940.  
38Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 326. 
39Biberaj, Albania in Transition, 329–330. 
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ideologies. First, the chapter studies Ted Gurr’s Relative Deprivation Theory, which 
provides the basis for understanding sources of grievances and their role in explaining the 
emergence of ideological and violent radicalization.40 Then, the chapter outlines Social 
Movement Theory, which explains how social processes, political opportunities, and 
mobilizing structures transform grievances into collective actions that seek social and 
political change.41 Additionally, the chapter studies concepts from Religious 
Fundamentalism Theory literature, including factors that influence the rise of 
fundamentalist interpretations of religions, including Islamic fundamentalism, around the 
world.42 Moreover, the chapter considered factors that influence the emergence of radical 
interpretations of Islam, such as Salafism, and justification for use of violence to protect 
one’s faith.43 Lastly, drawing concepts from these bodies of literature the chapter 
proposes a model that consists of the following sets of variables: 1) political and socio-
economic conditions as sources of grievances, 2) foreign NGOs and charities as a source 
of proliferating a radical interpretation of Islam, and 3) social connections and online 
propaganda as facilitating radicalization and recruitment to ISIS.  
Chapters III, IV, and V use the radicalization model to analyze the rise of 
ideological and violent radicalization among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Albania, and 
North Macedonia, respectively, to investigate the conditions under which individuals 
have joined ISIS. Each of the case studies begins by investigating socio-economic 
conditions to understand the sources of grievances among foreign fighters in particular. 
Then, each chapter considers the role of foreign charities and NGOs with ties to Persian 
Gulf countries as sources of proliferation of foreign and radical interpretations of Islam, 
such as Salafism. Additionally, each case looks at the role of Salafi-educated Albanian 
                                                 
40Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), ix.  
41Doug McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed., (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
23, 141, 261. 
42Gabriel A. Almond, et.al, Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 7–10. 
43Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 45, 85, 135, 167; Heather S. Gregg, Path to Salvation: Religious Violence 
from the Crusades to Jihad (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 4–7, 32–31. 
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clerics, and family and friendship relations as sources of radicalization and recruitment of 
ethnic Albanians to join ISIS. Lastly, each case evaluates ISIS propaganda in the 
Albanian language and the potential role it might have played in radicalizing individuals, 
recruiting some of them on behalf of ISIS. 
Chapter VI, the final chapter, provides a summary of the findings of the thesis and 
presents some suggestions to the governments of Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia 
to consider in their national strategies and plans of action for preventing and countering 
violent extremism.   
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an analytical framework to investigate 
the factors that influence radicalization of ethnic Albanians in the Balkan region and the 
conditions under which they embrace and act upon militant Islamic ideologies. The issue 
of radicalization and violence in general, and Islamic radicalization and violence in 
particular, requires a comprehensive approach that considers factors and variables at 
individual, group, societal, regional, and even international levels. Looking at these 
various levels of analysis provides a bigger picture of the phenomenon of radicalization, 
specifically radicalization that leads to violence, including Islamic jihadist terrorism.  
This chapter draws on three theoretical frameworks to investigate the causal 
factors of radicalization of ethnic Albanians: Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT), Social 
Movement Theory (SMT), and Religious Fundamentalism Theory (RFT). This chapter 
starts by providing a general definition of the term radicalization, the controversies 
related to this term, and a causal link between radicalization and violence. It then 
provides a detailed look at RDT, SMT, and RFT and identifies which casual factors are 
important in creating conditions for radicalization in general and violent radicalization in 
particular. Finally, this chapter constructs an analytical framework that will be utilized to 
analyze radicalization among ethnic Albanians in Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, 
and their tendency to join radical Islamic groups outside their countries of residence.  
B. WHAT IS RADICALIZATION?  
Terrorism scholar Peter Neumann, in his article “The Trouble with 
Radicalization,” notes that debates over the term ‘radicalization’ have caused polarization 
in academia, to the point where various academics “claim that radicalization is a myth 
promoted by the media and security agencies for the purpose of [anchoring] news 
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agendas … [and legitimizing] policy responses.”44 Neumann provides a simple definition 
of the term: “[a]t the most basic level, radicalization can be defined as the process 
whereby people become extremists.”45 Neumann further identifies that “contention and 
ambiguity” exist in regard to defining radicalization as thought or as action. The former 
he calls “cognitive radicalization,” meaning extremist ideology or belief, and the latter 
extremism he identifies as “behavior radicalization,” specifically terrorism or other 
violent actions.46 
Terrorism experts John Horgan and Randy Borum are strong proponents for 
separating extremist belief from extremist behavior, putting more focus on extremist 
behavior.47 Specifically, Horgan in a 2011 symposium on terrorism argues that 
“[scholars] should have not allowed [cognitive] radicalization to take center stage … [and 
that] preoccupation, if not obsession, with [cognitive] radicalization has come at the 
expense of increasing our knowledge and understanding of terrorist behavior.” 48 Horgan, 
also, stresses the fact that “radicalization [in general] remains very poorly conceptualized 
… [and] that the relationship between [cognitive] radicalization and terrorism remains 
poorly understood … to the point where radicalization is used synonymously with 
terrorism.”49 Similarly, Borum states that “sometimes the concepts of radicalism and 
                                                 
44“Until the early 2000s, hardly any references to radicalization could be found in academic literature. 
The rise to prominence of the term seems to be intimately linked with the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001.” See Peter R. Neumann, ‘Introduction,’ in Peter R. Neumann and Jacob Stoil, eds., Perspectives on 
Radicalization and Political Violence (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, 2008), 
3;  see also: Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2013): 
873. 
45Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 874. 
46Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 875–877. 
47Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 879. 
48“National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (START): Lessons 
Learned Since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” C-SPAN, video, 01:30:09, accessed 5 
December 2019, https://www.c-span.org/video/?301326-1/lessons-learned-terrorist-attacks-september-11-
2001; see also: Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 878. 
49“START: Lessons Learned Since the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,” 
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terrorism become conflated.”50 Additionally, he argues that “the term radicalization is 
widely used, but remains poorly defined,” and “to focus narrowly on ideological 
radicalization [or cognitive radicalization] risks implying that radical beliefs are a 
proxyor at least a necessary precursorfor terrorism, though we know this not to be 
true.”51 He also adds that,  
Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many 
terroristseven those who lay claim to a ‘cause’are not deeply 
ideological and may not ‘radicalize’ in any traditional sense. Different 
pathways and mechanisms operate in different ways for different people at 
different points in time and perhaps in different context. Radicalizing by 
developing or adopting extremist beliefs that justify violence is one 
possible pathway into terrorism involvement, but is certainly not the only 
one.52 
At first, it seems that both Horgan and Borum underemphasize the role that 
radical beliefs, ideas, and ideology play into pushing individuals or groups towards 
radical behavior, such as political violence or terrorism. Their concern, however, is in 
regard to counterterrorism policies that concentrate on counter-radicalization or 
deradicalization efforts that undervalue other forms or “action pathways” of involvement 
in terrorism.53  
Neumann, however, criticizes both Horgan’s and Borum’s arguments by 
categorizing them as “straw man” argumentative approaches.54 He argues that the 
different nuances in using political violence or peaceful activism to achieve political 
goals are very closely related to beliefs, ideas, and ideology.55 In addition to this, he adds 
that it is “…precisely because of the inherently political nature of politically motivated 
                                                 
50Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 
Journal of Strategic Security 4, no.4 (2012), 9. 
51Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 7–8.  
52Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A review of Social Science Theories,” 8. 
53“START: Lessons Learned Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,” C-SPAN.; See also: 
Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories,” 9–11. 
54Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 880. 
55Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 881. 
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violence that terrorist groups and their members are defined with reference to their 
ideology.”56 Ultimately, he proposes that to better understand why individuals, groups, or 
societies justify the use of violence and terrorist acts “a holistic understanding of both 
cognitive and behavioral processes” is necessary.57   
Despite many disagreements on defining radicalization, most scholarship agrees 
that radicalization is a process. For example, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko’s 
“pyramid model” identifies three different levels of analysis to describe the radicalization 
process—individual, group, and mass—composed of 12 different mechanisms that 
conceptualize “radicalization as a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings 
and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence.”58 Fathali Moghadam’s 
“staircase to terrorism” provides a conceptual model for understanding the “social and 
psychological processes” that radicalize individuals and drive them toward engaging in 
violence and terrorist acts.59 Horgan, in Walking Away from Terrorism, differentiates 
between cognitive and behavioral radicalization by providing two terms with their 
respective definitions; radicalization and violent radicalization.60 For this thesis, 
Horgan’s violent radicalization definition will be used. First, he defines radicalization in 
general as “the social and psychological process of incrementally experienced 
commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. Radicalization may not 
necessarily lead to violence, but is one of several risk factors.”61 Whereas he defines 
violent radicalization as  
the social and psychological process of increased and focused 
radicalization through involvement with a violent non-state movement. 
                                                 
56Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 881. 
57Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization,” 885. 
58Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways 
Toward Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 3 (2008):415–433, DOI: 10.1080/
09546550802073367. 
59Fathali M. Moghadam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2, (2005):161, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.60.2.161. 
60John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and 
Extremist Movements (New York: Routledge, 2009), 152. 
61Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 152.  
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Violent radicalization encompasses the phases of a) becoming involved 
with a terrorist group and b) remaining involved and engaging in terrorist 
activity; it involves a process of pre-involvement searching for the 
opportunity to engage in violence and the exploration of competing 
alternatives; the individual must have both the opportunity for engagement 
as well as the capacity to make the decision about that engagement.62 
Thus, the main point that Horgan portrays in the two definitions to differentiate 
between non-violent cognitive radicalism and violent behavioral radicalism is becoming 
and remaining involved with a terrorist group. But, also, when referring to violent 
radicalism he acknowledges that a pre-involvement phase is necessary, which, according 
to him, is a phase between radicalization and violent radicalization.63 For this phase 
Horgan refers to concepts such as opportunities, exploration, search for competing 
alternatives, and individual capacities to make the decision to engage in violent terrorist 
movements. All these entail different factors, internal and external, that influence 
individuals and groups to shift from non-violent radicalization to violent radicalization. 
But, at the same time, failure to consider factors that influence the development of non-
violent radicalization will provide a shallow analysis of the issues surrounding violent 
radicalization.  
C. CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION 
Considering the previous discussions, in this third section of the chapter, to better 
portray a holistic approach for understanding the factors that influence cognitive and 
behavioral radicalization, three particular theories of social sciences are reviewed. These 
theories are: Relative Deprivation Theory, Social Movement Theory, and Religious 
Fundamentalism Theory.  
1. Relative Deprivation Theory 
Ted Gurr, in Why Men Rebel, develops the RDT framework for explaining causes 
of political violence. This framework consists of three causal stages: 1) “development of 
                                                 
62Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 152. 
63Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism, 151. 
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discontent,” 2) “politization of discontent,” and 3)” actualization in violent action against 
political objects or actors.”64 Gurr writes that “to understand grievances [or discontents], 
we must first examine where people stand in society and what goods and bads they 
experience from governments. It is not enough to point to big economic and social 
structures.... We need to understand how people interpret situations in which they find 
themselves.”65 This is important because very often scholars of political violence have 
considered politico-social protests and rebellions as absolute indicators of political, 
social, and economic factors. Instead, Gurr presents a compelling proposition that 
postulates that the potential for men to resort to violence can be better explained through 
relative rather than absolute interpretations of political, social, and economic factors. 
Essential to this theory is the concept of Relative Deprivation (RD), which is defined as 
the “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations and their value 
capabilities.”66 In general, Gurr posits that discontent will emerge if there is a difference 
between what individuals actually receive (value capabilities) and what they believe they 
deserve to receive (value expectations). Gurr believes that this is the basic condition that 
predisposes men to action and violence.67  
Gurr argues that there are two general conditions that create discrepancy between 
“what ought to be and what is”68 that lead to increased RD: an increase in value 
expectations without a comparable increase in value capabilities, and a decrease in value 
capabilities with comparable effects.69 Yet, he says that the level of action or violence, 
including the scope, intensity, and duration “is determined by men’s belief about the 
sources of deprivation and about the normative and utilitarian justifiability of violent 
action directed at the agents responsible for it.”70 Therefore, the perception of deprivation 
                                                 
64Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 12–13. 
65Gurr, Why Men Rebel, xi. 
66Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 13. 
67Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 13. 
68Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 23. 
69Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 92. 
70Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 13, 29–30. 
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is a psycho-social calculation, a subjective and relative interpretation that first starts with 
the individual, but can manifest into a larger group phenomena based on various local 
contexts of political, social, or economic factors.71 Considering this, Gurr identifies the 
following variables (Table 1) that cause comparable increases in expectations or 
comparable decreases in capabilities, resulting in increased RD.  
  
                                                 
71Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 23, 155.  
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Table 1. Variables that effect RD divided into value expectations and value 
capabilities72 
Sources of Rising 
Expectations 
A brief Explanation of the variables 
Value Expectations: “Goods and conditions of life to 
which people believe they are rightfully entitled” 
1. New Modes of 
Life 
Exposure to Western ways of life, modernity, increasing 
literacy and quality of education, increased urbanization, 
migration from rural to urban areas etc., are some factors 
that influence increased expectations.   
2. New Ideologies “Ideologies are ‘frameworks of consciousness’ which 
provide men with an interpretation of the world for purpose 
of acting upon it.” In conditions where people’s old 
ideational systems do not provide a solution to their 
grievances, they become susceptible to new ideologies that 
offer a better alternative  
3. Value Gains of 
Reference Groups 
If another “comparative reference group” gains more, then 
the perception of RD increases for the group in question.  
4. Value 
Disequilibria  
Broadly, value disequilibria relates to social standing. For 
example, Gurr posits that the sharp discrepancy in the socio-
economic standing between groups creates favorable 
conditions for political disorder. But this is not limited to 
economic or financial factors. Unequal distribution of 
social/political participation and other welfare values can be 
sources of rising expectations.  
Determinants of Value 
Capabilities 
Value capabilities: “goods and conditions that men think 
they are capable of getting and keeping” 
1. Welfare Value 
Capabilities 
This category includes well-being, wealth, employment 
skills, education opportunities, health and welfare benefits 




This category includes those benefits achieved from 
socialization with others, including family, community, etc. 
Broadly, it relates to psychological satisfaction, such as 
love, belongingness, self-esteem, respect, social status, 
friendship etc.  
3. Power Value 
Capabilities 
This category includes participation in collective action, 
political processes, and a sense of order and collective 
safety. It refers to the extent that an individual feels that 
actions he or she takes are not interfered with by others.  
 
                                                 
72Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 24, 92–143, 194. 
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The aforementioned sources of RD provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
development of discontent and grievancesthe first causal stage necessary for political 
violence to occur. On the other hand, Gurr’s explanation of the treatment of the second 
and third causal stages of RDTpolitization of discontent and actualization of political 
violenceare less developed. He acknowledges that the “Why Men Rebel model looks at 
the extent and structures of group organization … but does not provide a full account of 
the processes by which [these groups] become organized.”73 In other words, by itself, 
RDT does not give a full account of the mechanisms and conditions that lead to political, 
social, ethnic, or religious violence. However, it provides a strong foundation for 
identifying sources of grievances. In order to better understand the processes and 
mechanisms that politicize grievances and cause collective action and violence, a detailed 
analysis of Social Movement Theory is important.   
2. Social Movement Theory  
Sociologists Doug McAdam and David Snow claim that the vast literature on 
social movements provides various definitions of the concept of social movement.74 
Nonetheless, these definitions cover similar elements such as, “some degree of 
organization, some degree of temporal continuity, change-oriented goals, and some use of 
extra–institutional forms of action to supplement more institutional forms of action.”75 
The authors define a social movement as a “loose collectivity acting with some degree of 
organization, temporal continuity, and reliance on noninstitutionalized forms of action to 
promote or resist change in the group, society, or world order of which it is part.”76 
Generally speaking, SMT concentrates on why and how aggrieved individuals mobilize 
and act collectively. By contrast, Klandermans et al. claim that most social movement 
literature considers grievances as a given and do not specifically formulate or theorize 
                                                 
73Gurr, Why Men Rebel, xi. 
74Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, introduction to Readings on Social Movements: Origins, 
Dynamics, and Outcomes, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010), 1. 
75McAdam and Snow, Introduction, 1.  
76McAdam and Snow, Introduction, 1.  
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“how such grievances are formed.”77 Gurr’s RDT, described earlier, complements SMT 
in clarifying why and how grievances emerge.  
To describe the mechanisms and processes that translate grievances into social 
movements, sociologists McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald identify three broad categories of 
factors: “political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing processes.”78 
Political opportunities relate to a broad range of governance variables that either restrict 
or facilitate mobilization and collective action. McAdam et al. group these variables into 
four dimensions:  
1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political 
system. 
2. The stability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically 
undergird a polity. 
3. The presence of elite allies. 
4. The state’s capacity and propensity for repression.79 
These factors influence the socio-political interaction between a social movement 
and the state-political system. In other words, a social movement’s organizational 
structure, political aims and objectives, strategies, tactics, and level of mobilization will 
be significantly shaped by political opportunities, which are “unique to the national 
[local, or supranational] context in which [these social movements operate or] are 
embedded.”80  
                                                 
77Bert Klandermans, Marlene Roefs, and Johan Olivier, “Grievance Formation in a Country in 
Transition: South Africa, 1994–1998,” in Readings on Social Movement: Origins, Dynamics, and 
Outcomes, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010), 397–
398. 
78McAdam et al., introduction to Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political 
Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. By Doug MacAdam, John D. McCarthy, 
and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 
79McAdam et al., Introduction, 10. 
80McAdam et al., Introduction, 3. 
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Another key variable in social movements is mobilizing structures, which are 
“those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and 
engage in collective action.”81 Mobilizing structures, in broad terms, include material 
resources and social processes necessary for social movements to mobilize and achieve 
desired collective objectives. For example, informal or semi-formal institutions such as 
family, friendship, volunteer organizations, religious communities and so on can be 
thought of as facilitating mobilization. Among formal structures or institutions that 
significantly enhance material resources and mobilizing capacity of social movements are 
NGOs, charity organizations, interest groups, political parties, and external state actors.82 
In current times, the internet, computers, cellular technology, mass media, and social 
media provide vast opportunities for social movements to increase membership or 
publicize their interests and political objectives.  
The growth of information technology also closely relates to the third factor that 
creates social movements, framing processes. Technology and mass media are crucial to 
distributing framing narratives in today’s hyperconnected world. McAdam et al. 
emphasize sociologist David Snow’s definition of framing as “the conscious strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understanding of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”83 Social movements create 
“structural potential for [collective] action”84 through political opportunities and 
mobilizing structures. Without framing, however, this potential for action could not be 
realized into collective action. Framing, therefore, is a “[mediator] between opportunity, 
organization, and action” for a social movement.85  David Snow and Scott Byrd claim 
that the framing aspect of social movements “focuses attention on the process of framing 
                                                 
81McAdam et al., Introduction, 3. 
82Ulan Sadibekov, “Understanding the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan through Social Movement 
Theory, and Analyzing and Evaluating its Potential Threat to Kazakhstan” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, December 2014), 15, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44662.  
83McAdam et al., Introduction 6. 
84McAdam et al., Introduction, 5. 
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in relation to the development of innovative amplifications and extensions of […] 
existing ideologies or discourses, which, in turn, are conceptualized as collective action 
frames.”86 In the same vein, McAdam et al. write that,  
Culture, ideology, and strategic framing…are linked because they are the 
topics that deal with the content and processes by which meaning is 
attached to objects and actions. […] culture is the shared beliefs and 
understandings, mediated by and constituted by symbols and language, of 
a group or society. Ideology is the set of beliefs that are used to justify or 
challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the 
political world. Frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic 
representation, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and 
events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.87 
These strategic frames or narratives, influenced by ideology, culture, history, and 
the role of leadership, are constructed through three core framing tasks: diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framing.88  
Diagnostic framing leverages grievances and focuses on “consensus mobilization” 
to create narratives and messages of collective grievance by answering the questions 
“what is or went wrong?” and “ who or what is to blame?”89 Prognostic framing focuses 
on “action mobilization” by describing objectives to be achieved, and prescribing the 
means, tactics, actions that need to be taken to achieve those objectives.90 In other words, 
prognostic framing answers the questions of “what is to be done and how?” of collective 
action.91 Motivational framing, on the other hand, “involves the elaboration of a call to 
                                                 
86David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 
in Readings on Social Movement: Origins, Dynamics, and Outcomes, ed. Doug McAdam and David A. 
Snow (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2010), 323. 
87Mayer N. Zald, “Culture, ideology, and strategic framing,” in Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, ed. By Doug 
MacAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
262. 
88Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 323.  
89Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 323. 
90Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 326. 
91Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 326. 
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arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis.”92 
Motivational framing provides the motives for inactive supporters to become active 
participants. Additionally, motivational framing can also provide the justification for use 
of violence and other sensational terrorist acts, such as suicide terrorist acts, as actions 
designed to achieve desired political objectives. From this discussion, it is clear that 
history, culture, ideology, and leadership are crucial to the framing process.  
More importantly, ideology is a critical element that “distinguishes revolution 
from routine contention of power.”93 Various ideologies have been and are the basis of 
legitimacy for violence and terrorist acts around the world. Religious Fundamentalism 
Theory in general, and Islamic fundamentalism in particular, provide the basis for 
understanding how ideology in a religious context influences radicalization and the use of 
violence. Therefore, a detailed look at RFT will enhance both RDT and SMT in 
explaining how militant Islamic ideologies “create or form belief systems that justify 
violence and extremism for social and political change.”94  
3. Religious Fundamentalism Theory  
Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, in Strong Religion: 
The Rise of Fundamentalism around the World, define fundamentalism as “a discernible 
pattern of religious militance by which self-styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the 
erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create 
viable alternatives to secular institutions and behaviors.”95 The authors clarify various 
problems with using the word fundamentalism and provide caution for its understanding 
and use. For example, terms such as radicalism, terrorism, or violent extremism are used 
synonymously or interchangeably with fundamentalism. Classifying fundamentalism as 
synonymous with terrorism or violent extremism, however, is unhelpful because it does 
not help distinguish between radicals, who express their views non-violently, and 
                                                 
92Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 327. 
93Snow and Byrd, “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements,” 322. 
94Maskaliūnaitė, “Exploring the Theories of Radicalization,” 9. 
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terrorists who resort to violent extremism.96 Perhaps the term radicalism is more useful 
than fundamentalism because it denotes extreme beliefs, but not necessarily violence. 
After all, not all radicalized individuals become terrorists; however, almost all violent 
religious groups hold radical belief systems and ideologies.97  
Another opposition to the word fundamentalism comes from mainstream religious 
believers, who claim that the extremists or radicals, who are a minority, represent a 
distorted, perverted, or incorrect account of the ‘fundamentals’ of their religion.98 
Furthermore, a good number of radical groups that do resort to violence fight internal 
threats to the religion more so than external threats, which is not captured in the term.99 
Despite the controversies in using the term, fundamentalism is about religion. 
Fundamentalism “equates ‘strong religion’ with ‘purity’ and purity, with uniformity of 
belief and practice.”100  
Almond et al., in their work, study various fundamentalist movements across 
major world religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 
From this study they provide the following ideological and organizational characteristics 
of these fundamentalist movements. These characteristics are summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
                                                 
96Almond et al., Strong Religion, 14. 
97I write ‘almost all terrorists…hold radical beliefs’ so as not to include those terrorist acts that are a 
result of an external coercion or psychological dysfunction. Also in using the term radical here I used an 
etymological definition to identify similarities between fundamental and radical terms. Fundamental (from 
Latin fundamentum “foundation”) and radical (from Latin radix/radicalis, “root/ going to the origin”) 
have similar connotations in a religious or political context. This is the main rationale for using radical, 
radicalism, radicalized as expressive of fundamentalist ideologiesin both religious and nonreligious 
contexts, (https://www.etymonline.com/word/, accessed 26 November 2018). 
98Almond et.al, Strong Religion, 15. 
99Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinsberg ed., Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism 
(Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), 60. 
100Almond et al., Strong Religion, 17.  
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Table 2. Characteristics of fundamentalist movements101 
                                                 
101Michael O. Emerson and David Hartman, “The Rise of Religious Fundamentalism,” Annual Review 




1. Reactivity to the 
Marginalization 
of Religion 
This is the key characteristic that “labels a movement as 
Fundamentalist.” It describes all religious fundamentalist 
movements as reactionary to perceived or actual threats. 
Modernity, globalization, Western culture, and secularism are 
some of the threats that most religious fundamentalist 
movements react against.  
2. Selectivity For the purpose of strengthening the movement, increasing 
membership, gaining political credit, etc. Key authoritarian 
leadership within these movements specifically select religious 
scripture and texts, and reshape meaning and interpretations of 




An ‘us versus them’ worldview. Divided all into good or evil, 
light or dark, righteous or unrighteous.  
4. Absolutism and 
Inerrancy 
Fundamentalists tend to interpret the scriptures in absolute 
terms, and do not accept interpretations based on human logic 
and critical rationality. They strive to “preserve the absolutist 
character of the sacred text or tradition.”   
5. Millennialism 
and Messianism 
Belief in the end of time, and the entry or return of “the 
Messiah, the Savior, the Hidden Imam. In the final day of 
judgement, suffering will end, evil will be vanquished, and 




6. Elect, Chosen 
membership 
Members of the fundamentalist movements believe that its 
members are purposefully selected by divinity, and are 
specifically chosen to defend the religious tradition. 
7. Sharp boundaries Dualistic worldviews of the fundamentalist movements also 
permeate into physical boundaries.  
8. Authoritarian 
Organization 
Charismatic, inerrant leadership with extraordinary qualities 
that sets the leader apart from anyone else.  
9. Behavioral 
Requirements 
“[T]he members’ time, space, and activity are a group source, 
not an individual one. Elaborate behavioral requirements create 
a powerful affective dimension, an imitative, conforming 
dimension.” There are clearly articulated rules in regard to 
dress, appearance, sexuality, speech, eating, drinking, etc.  
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The first characteristic, the defense of religion, “is the sine qua non of 
fundamentalism; without it, a movement cannot be labeled fundamentalist.” 102 
Similarly, Heather S. Gregg in Path to Salvation writes that “fundamentalism is defined 
by its goal, to protect a group’s faith, which it perceives to be under threat.”103 These 
threats range from colonialism to modernity to globalization, and secularism.104 
Additionally, Gregg writes that fundamentalism, in reaction to these threats, can be 
manifested both violently and non-violently.105 Gregg identifies two general factors that 
give rise to religious fundamentalism. These factors are: 
1) A perceived or actual threat to religion as a whole. This implies that 
fundamentalism is not preemptive but is reactionary. 
2) Certain social, political, economic conditions in which fundamentalist 
movements or groups emerge and operate provide context in 
understanding why some resort to violence and others do not ‘in 
preserving the group’s religious practices, identity, and the way of life.’106  
From this theoretical background on fundamentalism, Gregg proposes a four-
variable theoretical framework that explains the causes of religious violence, shown in 





                                                 
102Almond et al., Strong Religion, 94.  
103Gregg, Path to Salvation, 22. 
104Gregg, Path to Salvation, 27.  
105Gregg, Path to Salvation, 22. 
106Gregg, Path to Salvation, 27. 
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Table 3. Causes of religiously motivated violence107 
Context Leaders Followers Resources 
What social and 
political contexts 
produce a religious 
reaction? 
Who is interpreting 
the faith and by 
what authority? 
Why do followers 
believe 
interpretations and 
answer the call to 
fight in defense of 
the faith? 
Which resources 
matter for the 
persistence and 
spread of religious 
violence? 
 
Gregg uses the causal relationships among the four factors, particularly, to 
understand how violence is justified and why it is used in a religious context. The same 
variables and their causal relationships can also be used to understand cognitive 
radicalization (radical belief) that potentially leads to radical behavior such as violent 
extremism.  
In relation to Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic radical groups, Islamic 
radicalization expert Quintan Wiktorowicz, in Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism 
in the West, uses similar variables to answer the questions of why Muslims radicalize in 
Western societies and why they join radical groups that act violently to achieve their 
goals.108 He groups these variables into three broad parallel processes: cognitive opening 
and religious seeking, constructing sacred authority, and culturing and commitment.109 
Wiktorowicz claims that cognitive openings are caused by moments of crisis. Factors that 
introduce crisis are numerous and vary across individuals. Wiktorowicz categorizes these 
factors into economic, social-cultural, political, and idiosyncratic experiences.110 
Additionally, he adds that cognitive openings can also be encouraged by movements, 
groups, or leadership through outreach, networking, and socialization.111 Once a 
cognitive opening is manifested, the individual is more likely to go through a “religious 
                                                 
107Source: Gregg, Path to Salvation, 31. 
108Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 20–30. 
109Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 20–30. 
110Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 20. 
111Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 21. 
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seeking process … in which an individual searches for some satisfactory system of 
religious meaning to interpret and resolve discontent.”112 In this process, the role of 
radical religious groups, with all of their religious resources, becomes even more 
important. Ultimately these groups “seek to prompt religious ideological conversion.”113 
Being receptive to joining is not sufficient in explaining why some become participants 
and others do not, or why some follow non-violent Islamic activism and others join 
Islamic radical groups that resort to violence.  
Therefore, constructing a “sacred authority” is essential for religious leaders.114 
Wiktorowicz identifies two criteria that Muslims use to evaluate their religious leaders 
and scholars: religious knowledge and good character.115 Once authority is established, 
Muslim believers can trust and accept their interpretation of religious scripture, tradition, 
rituals, and practices. He notes, however, that determining religious knowledge is more 
subjective and is based, in part, on the number of followers.116 On the other hand, he also 
stresses that good character in a religious leader is valued in terms of independence from 
external pressures and, if a religious scholar is not influenced by other factors rather than 
religious and spiritual commitment, he is perceived to have a good religious character and 
worthy to be followed. Radical religious groups often attack moderate leaders who are 
influenced by “non-religious” factors as deviant, hypocritical, or corrupt, and who do not 
serve religion but their self-interest. Furthermore, literal interpretations of Islamic 
religious scriptures and prophetic traditions, namely Quranic verses and Hadith (sayings 
of the Prophet Muhammed) are tools that radical leaders and scholars selectively use to 
attack and discredit moderate religious scholars and leaders.117  
                                                 
112Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 21. 
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114Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 26. 
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Wiktorowicz states that authority is a critical concern for all social movements 
that strive for collective action. He quotes terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw who says 
that “Leaders and their organizations help shape people’s private preferences, through 
ideological indoctrination, organized group actions to impress and inspire, persuasive 
exhortations to change one’s beliefs, and charismatic appeals.”118 Wiktorowicz refers to 
this ideological indoctrination process as “culturing and commitment.”119 He also adds 
that “through a variety of micro-mobilization contexts, especially religious lessons, 
Islamic activists try to convince audiences and potential adherents that their primary 
concern should be salvation in the hereafter.”120 Thus, the concept of “saving one’s soul 
on Judgement Day” becomes a spiritual individual goal that can be channeled toward 
achieving the greater good of the religious community, namely protection of the faith 
from perceived threats.121  
Wiktorowicz further identifies that the concept of divine salvation is an element 
of all religious fundamentalist or radical movements, specifically Salafism. Nonetheless, 
the ways religious leaders construct strategies for believers, adherents, and activists to 
achieve salvation divides leaders into three general categories: those that protect and 
purify the faith through religious propagation only, those that engage in the political 
system, and those that see violence (jihad) as the only tool to protect the faith.122 These 
divisions within Salafism are further described in the following paragraphs.    
4. Salafism as “Strong Religion” 
The term Salafi, from its Arabic root salaf, means ‘pious forefathers’ and refers to 
the early ages of Islam as practiced by the companions of Prophet Muhammed and the 
generation after them. The central idea of Salafi doctrine is living the tenets of Islam the 
same way as it was during this “golden era” of the faith. This is the common identity for 
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119Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising, 27. 
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all Salafis, who are united by a common religious creed that entails very conservative 
adherence to the oneness of God (Tawhid), the Quran, and the Prophetic method, or 
Sunna.123  
Despite the fact that the religious creed of Salafism is similar across the 
movement, different accounts on how to respond to today’s religious issues and problems 
have created divisions within the movement. Because of these different “contextual 
readings” Wiktorowicz divides Salafism into three major factions; purists, politicos, and 
jihadists.124 Purists are concerned with preserving the fundamentals of religion through 
non-violent means such as religious propagation and education. They see involvement in 
politics as a threat to religious purity because of political corruption. Additionally, they 
condemn the use of violence to establish and apply Islamic Law (Sharia) among Muslim 
societies because violence will produce more evil than good for the religion. Political 
Salafists, on the other hand, advocate that involvement in politics is necessary to establish 
religion within the political system because only God has legislative power over humans. 
They refrain from using violence and are more focused on political processes to achieve 
their religious-political goals. Jihadist Salafists are stronger proponents of using violence 
and armed struggle as the principal means of change. Thus, in Wiktorowitcz’s words, 
“[the] splits are about contextual analysis, and not belief.”125  
Understanding Salafism is important for investigating of the causes of Islamically 
motivated violence because the ideological foundations of this movement have inspired 
major global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaida and ISIS. Furthermore, in a local 
context, ethnic Albanians in the Balkans who have joined various terrorist organizations 
from the start of the Syrian Civil War, including ISIS, generally are influenced by Salafist 
doctrine. 
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Selective interpretations of religious matters and which actions to take to purify, 
propagate, or protect the faith—either violently, non-violently, or strictly religiously, or 
through the democratic process—rest with the authority of religious leaders. But 
interpretation alone is not sufficient to explain why some radicalized ethnic Albanians 
join global jihadist groups and organizations such as ISIS. Thus, besides authority and 
identity of religious leadership, it is also important to investigate what local formal and 
informal religious resources facilitate radicalization of ethnic Albanians and pushes them 
to join jihadist terrorist groups such as ISIS.    
D. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Building on this discussion, the following analytical framework is used to 
investigate the factors that influence Islamic radicalization among ethnic Albanians in the 
Balkans and their tendency to join violent extremist and jihadist terrorist groups such as 
ISIS. Cognitive radicalization is a key risk factor that influences ethnic Albanians to join 
violent extremist groups such as ISIS. This factor alone, however, is not sufficient. 
Looking at religious mobilization processes and resources can provide an understanding 
of how radicalized ethnic Albanians come to join terrorist organizations far away from 
their country of residence. Yet, it is also equally important to understand why ethnic 
Albanians become ideologically or cognitively radicalized in the first place. Specifically, 
this framework proposes answering the following three questions to better understand the 
conditions under which ethnic Albanians in the Balkans radicalize and embrace radical 
and violent Islamic groups: 1) What are the social, political, and economic factors that 
create sentiments of discontent and grievances among ethnic Albanians? 2) What are the 
religious material, organizational resources, and processes that facilitate radicalization? 
And 3) Why do some radicalized ethnic Albanians join violent extremist and jihadist 





Table 4. Factors of religious radicalization and violent extremism 
Relative Deprivation as 
Sources of Grievances 
Resources of Religious 
Mobilization 
Violent Radicalization 
What are the social, 
political, and economic 
factors that create 
discontent and grievances 
among ethnic Albanians? 
What are the religious 
material, organizational 
resources, and processes 
that facilitate 
radicalization? 
Why do some ethnic 
Albanians join violent 
extremist and jihadist 




This chapter provided an overview of the key literatures on radicalization, 
fundamentalism, and Salafism to begin an investigation of the conditions under which 
ethnic Albanians have radicalized and embraced violent groups like ISIS. Furthermore, 
the chapter outlined three theories, RDT, SMT, and RFT, to develop a theoretical 
framework that will allow a comprehensive understanding of factors that influence ethnic 
Albanians to be radicalized and embrace violent extremist and jihadist terrorist groups 
such as ISIS. 
The next chapter uses this framework to investigate the factors that have 
influenced and continue to influence ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to support and join 
violent extremist groups such as ISIS. 
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III. KOSOVO  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, between 334 and 358 Kosovo 
nationals have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State, and 40 children have 
been born in ISIS-held territories, bringing the total number of Kosovars in the region to 
398.126 The majority of these citizens—approximately 80%—are reported to have 
traveled to ISIS-held territories between 2013 and 2015.127 Following this increase in 
foreign fighters, the Kosovo government conducted a countrywide counterterrorism 
operation and detained around 55 individuals suspected to have joined ISIS, to be 
involved in foreign fighter recruitment, and to have provided radical religious preaching 
or engaged in religious hate speech. Within this group, the government also arrested and 
detained about 15 imams, Islamic clerics, among them some official imams of the 
Kosovo Muslim Community (BIK, in Albanian).128 This single event prompted media 
coverage to label Kosovo as “fertile … ground for ISIS” 129 and “a hotbed for radical 
Islamists and a pipeline for jihadists.”130  
Most of the media reports point to radical imams and radicalized individuals 
influenced by Salafism as the causes of the high number of foreign fighters from Kosovo 
relative to its population. Additionally, they stress the role of foreign charities and NGOs 
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arrestuar-per-terrorizem/.  
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from the Gulf States as having directly and indirectly driven some Kosovo nationals to 
become ideologically radicalized and join extremist groups like ISIS.131 On the other 
hand, social, economic, and political factors that create favorable conditions for 
ideological and violent radicalization to emerge, have been significantly less studied.  
This chapter argues that to better understand the phenomenon of Kosovo’s foreign 
fighters and Islamic radicalization, in addition to the mobilization of religious resources 
and entities, it is crucial to look at socio-economic and political factors within a local 
context. This approach can help identify the sources of individual and community 
grievances among Kosovo Albanians that might have created or continue to create the 
conditions for cognitive radicalization. This approach first explains why some ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo radicalize, and others do not. Then, by looking at the mobilization 
of religious resources, such as the role of radical Islamic clerics, foreign charities and 
NGOs, recruiting networks, and ISIS online propaganda, this investigation can help 
inform why some cognitively radicalized ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have decided to 
join violent extremist organizations such as ISIS, while others have not.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first provides an overview of the 
demographic composition of Kosovo’s foreign fighter contingent, noting factors like age 
and socio-economic status. Focusing on foreign fighters, the second part begins with a 
brief summary of the radicalization model proposed in Chapter II, and then uses the 
analytical framework to investigate the various factors that have created a conducive 
environment for the cognitive radicalization of Kosovo Albanians. Specifically, socio-
economic conditions, including unemployment, education, and new fundamentalist 
Islamist ideologies, such as Salafism, are analyzed as factors that have influenced 
cognitive radicalization. This section also analyzes factors, including religious NGOs and 
charities, radical religious leaders, and ISIS propaganda, that have facilitated behavioral, 
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violent radicalization among foreign fighters. Finally, the last part provides a short 
summary of the chapter.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF KOSOVO’S FOREIGN FIGHTERS  
In absolute terms, the total number of foreign fighters originating from Kosovo is 
low when compared to Western European countries such as France, Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany. In per capita terms, however, Kosovo ranks first in Europe for 
foreign fighters within the 2011–2017 time period. With a population of approximately 
1.8 million, which is 95% Muslim, Kosovo’s foreign fighter recruitment rate is about 21 
fighters per 100,000 Muslim citizens.132 
Some scholars argue that representing relative numbers based on total population 
numbers is a more correct approach. For example, Adrian Shtuni, an expert in terrorism 
studies, argues that a per capita representation is a more correct approach. He chooses 
this approach because, if Europe is considered in general, a good portion of foreign 
fighters who have joined ISIS have converted to Islam.133 More precisely, a 2016 report 
from the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague writes that 
from 11 European Union Member States, 6% to 23 % of foreign fighters are converts.134  
On the other hand, other authors argue that calculations based on the Muslim 
population of countries of origin provide a more accurate picture of the problem.135 
Specifically, Shpend Kursani of Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS), based in 
Prishtina, Kosovo, advocates for calculating and reporting numbers based on the total 
Muslim population, especially if Kosovo is compared to other European countries. This 
approach would rank Kosovo well behind some Western European countries. To put it in 
perspective, if the Muslim population is taken as the basis for representing the flow of 
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foreign fighters from the country of origin, Belgium, France, and the UK have 83, 30, and 
26 foreign fighters per 100,000 Muslims, respectively.136 From this point of view, 
Kosovo’s foreign fighter phenomenon would not be as alarming as represented in major 
regional and international media outlets. Indeed, the tendency for researchers, terrorism 
experts, and Kosovo officials to use the Muslim population as the basis of comparison is 
because of media hype that has represented Kosovo as a “fertile … ground for ISIS” in 
Europe.137  
Instead of evaluating Kosovo’s foreign fighter numbers in a comparative 
perspective against Balkan countries and even other Western European countries, it is 
more appropriate to understand the dynamics of the Kosovo foreign fighter phenomenon 
in a strictly Kosovan context. This approach can shed light on the possible underlying 
causes that have influenced Albanians from Kosovo to become initially radicalized and 
later influenced to join violent extremist organizations such as ISIS.  
Furthermore, data from various sources on foreign fighter demographic 
composition and place of residence show that the phenomenon is widespread throughout 
Kosovo. Age group analysis shows that approximately 76% of the foreign fighters were 
between 15 and 34 years old when ISIS declared the caliphate in 2014 (see Figure 1). 
Men over the age of 15 constitute 267 foreign fighters, or 80% of the total number, 
whereas, women total 51 foreign fighters, or 15% of the total number.  
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Figure 1. Kosovo foreign fighters by age group138  
Additionally, Figure 2 shows the distribution of 335 foreign fighters by place of 
residence of foreign fighter, including women and children who have left Kosovo and 
traveled to Syria and Iraq, initially joining opposition groups that fought against the 
Assad regime, such as the Al-Nusra Front, and later joined ISIS after the proclamation of 
the caliphate in June 2014.  
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Figure 2. Kosovo foreign fighters by municipality.139 
The data reported in Figure 2, in absolute numbers, show that there is a high 
number of foreign fighters, including children, from the municipalities of Pristina, Gjilan, 
Prizren, Kaçanik, Mitrovicë, Pejë, and Ferizaj: represented by 61, 36, 31, 24, 21, 18, and 
17 foreign fighters, respectively. Per capita calculations on the municipality level, 
however, indicate that municipalities with small populations in the east-southeast region 
of Kosovo are more prone to radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters. For 
example, for 10,000 Kosovo citizens, the municipalities of Hani i Elezit, Kacanik, Gjilan, 
Viti, and Obiliq have 11, 6, 3, 2, and 2, respectivelyas compared to fewer than 2 in 
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Pristina (about 1.6 per 10,000 citizens), which ranks first in the country with 66 foreign 
fighters in absolute terms.140    
Nonetheless, considering the fact that the foreign fighter phenomenon is 
widespread across Kosovo, with some regions producing more than others, no 
overarching root cause can be stated as the main driver to radicalization and motivation 
for joining ISIS. Various factors have influenced Islamic radicalization in general and 
violent radicalization in the case of foreign fighters.  
C. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION IN KOSOVO  
The radicalization model, presented in Chapter II, provides a framework to 
investigate the role of various factors causing Kosovar Albanians to embrace radical 
Islamic ideologies and join violent extremist groups such as ISIS. Specifically, the 
framework, first, proposes to investigate the socio-economic and political factors that 
create favorable conditions for cognitive, ideological radicalization in general. Then, it 
proposes to look at the mobilization of various religious resources and processesin a 
local and global contextthat have facilitated cognitive radicalization and, later, 
behavioral or violent radicalization, such as the decision to join ISIS.  
Utilizing the radicalization framework just discussed, this part of the chapter 
continues to analyze the various factors that have influenced the radicalization of 
Kosovo’s foreign fighters, causing them to join ISIS. First, socio-economic conditions, 
including unemployment and education, are evaluated as risk factors that create 
conducive environments for radicalization among Kosovo citizens in general and among 
Kosovo foreign fighters in particular. Then, foreign NGOs, especially those with ties to 
Saudi Arabia, are evaluated as sources of the proliferation of fundamentalist Islamic 
ideology such as Salafism. Additionally, the role of radical religious leaders, recruitment 
networks, and ISIS propaganda are analyzed as factors of violent radicalization and 
recruitment to join ISIS.  
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1. Grievances among Kosovo’s Albanian Foreign Fighters 
Since the end of the war, Kosovo has made significant progress toward the 
development and stability of the country. Despite this progress, however, Kosovo is the 
poorest country in the Balkans.141 In 2017, Kosovo’s nominal per capita GDP was a little 
less than US$4,000, putting it last in the region (see Figures 3 and 4).  
 
Figure 3. Balkan countries’ GDP per capita trend, 2000–2017142 
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Figure 4. 2017 GDP per capita in the Balkans143 
Moreover, unemployment in Kosovo sits at an average of 30%, and the data show 
that 15–24 year-olds and young adults 25–34 years of age are the two groups most at risk 
of unemployment, with rates of 52.5% and 34.3 % respectively in 2016 (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Kosovo unemployment rate by age group144 
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Furthermore, Kosovo has the youngest population in Europe. A little over 50% of 
the population is below the age of 29 and, within this group, approximately 20% are 
between 15 and 24 years of age.145 Finally, data from the Kosovo Agency of Statistics 
show that, between 2012 and 2017, 56–71% of Kosovo citizens who have actively 
searched for a job responded that they could not find a full-time job (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6. Reasons for not working at full-time job146 
The national data just provided indicate that high levels of unemployment, 
especially among those between 15 and 30 years of age, as well as a perception of a grim 
economic future could serve as sources of growing discontent and grievance among 
Kosovar nationals in general and the foreign fighters in particular. In other words, these 
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factors may create favorable environments for radical ideas and behavior to manifest, 
such as crime, political violence, and the adoption of radical religious ideologies.   
A 2018 report by the British Council, based on interviews and first-hand data, 
points out that socio-economic conditions have a “mixed role” in explaining 
radicalization in general and recruitment for ISIS in particular.147 Specifically, its author 
compiled socio-economic data for 54 foreign fighters, and after comparing the results 
Kosovo-wide, he determined that “the [average] socio-economic conditions of a foreign 
fighter from Kosovo seem to be leaning towards below the average value” for the 
country, meaning that these individuals tended to come from below average economic 




Figure 7. Comparison of socio-economic conditions of  foreign fighters  vs. 
Kosovo-wide average149 
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It is true that, based on a size sample of 54 foreign fighters, there are more foreign 
fighters —52%— originating from poor socio-economic standards when compared to the 
foreign fighters’ percentage from average and good socio-economic standards. It seems, 
however, that foreign fighters originating from average socio-economic status are 
disproportionate when compared to Kosovo wide population from the same socio-
economic status. In other words, individuals with average socio-economic background 
present a higher tendency to join ISIS when compared to those coming from poor and 
good socio-economic status. Thus being poor does not fully explain why some have 
joined ISIS and others have not.  
B. Xharra and N. Gojani, authors of a 2017 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) report on factors of radicalization among Kosovo foreign fighters, 
state that “[the research] did not [show] a clear connection between economic status and 
radicalization.”150 Their statement, however, is based on information from 13 interviews, 
including six foreign fighters who were serving sentences for terrorism charges, three 
who were being processed on bail, one who was not charged at all, and family members 
of three other returned foreign fighters. The authors, nonetheless, recognize the fact that 
only 13 interviewees do not constitute a strongly representative sample of the whole 
Kosovo foreign fighter contingent.151 Yet, they quote one of the interviewees who 
“report [ed] feelings of a sense of hopelessness and disappointment from not finding 
work in their field of study, and identified it as one of the reasons why they have traveled 
to Syria.”152 They described another interviewee who stated that he decided to travel to 
Syria because of his inability to find a steady job in Kosovo to support his severely ill 
parents. Moreover, the authors state that about half of the interviewees had traveled to EU 
countries sometime before deciding to travel to Syria and Iraq in search of better 
economic and life opportunities.153  
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Additionally, data on the unemployment level among the foreign fighter 
contingent, but also at national level, show a strong indication that socio-economic 
conditions and lack of job opportunities —combined together— over time have created 
feelings of frustration and loss of optimism in these individuals for their own and their 
families’ future. Specifically, 76% of individuals between the ages of 15 and 34 years 
who represent about 76–80% of the total foreign fighters, reported being unemployed at 
the time of travel to Syria and Iraq.154 The unemployment average for the same age 
group in Kosovo is approximately 46.5% (see Figure 3). This data suggest that the 
foreign fighters’ unemployment rate is almost twice the rate of the national average for 
this age group, which comprises the bulk of Kosovo’s foreign fighters. This discussion 
shows that individuals with average socio-economic status when faced with 
unemployment have a higher tendency to join ISIS.  
Education level is another factor considered by both reports as a risk factor that 
causes radicalization; however, both reports conclude that education levels are not a 
strong indicator of radicalization. Specifically, they compare the average education level 
of foreign fighters to the national average. Both reports estimate that 83–84% of foreign 
fighters have a secondary level of education (from 5th to 12th grade) whereas the national 
average is about 72%. Additionally, 9% of them have a college education, which is the 
same as the national level. Both reports, however, acknowledge that the quality of 
education that foreign fighters received in particular might explain the tendency for less 
educated individuals to become more prone to radicalization and to accept extremist 
worldviews and ideology.155 A 2018 EU Commission report on Kosovo states that, even 
though the country has increased its education budget, only a minimal portion of it goes 
for qualitative improvements.156 The report further adds that:  
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[t]he implementation of the curricula reform, [as per 2017–2021 Kosovo 
Education Strategic Plan and its Action Plan], is undermined by a lack of 
qualified teaching staff, teaching material and supplies and an 
underdeveloped student assessment system [and states further that] … 
[t]he quality of the education continues to be a challenge at all levels.157  
Additionally, the 2017 UNDP report states that a returned foreign fighter 
interviewee, during the interview, “spoke about how a Kosovo Albanian high-ranking 
member of ISIS had specifically asked recruiters in Kosovo not to send educated people 
to ISIS.”158 This shows that recruiters within Kosovo have targeted specific groups that 
are more vulnerable to accepting radical ideologies, but also less adept intellectually and 
rationally to reject more extreme views within the larger pool of Salafists, such as Salafi 
jihadists who believe that protection of the Muslim faith and Muslims comes through 
violence.  
2. Mobilization of Religious Resources  
The population in Kosovo is 95% Muslim, 2.2% Roman Catholic, and about 1.5% 
Eastern Orthodox, with the rest of the population identifying as Protestant, Jewish, or 
non-religious.159 Ethnic Albanians are predominantly Sunni Muslim, from the Hanafi 
school of law, with a small percentage of ethnic Albanians practicing Roman 
Catholicism.160 Additionally, approximately 15% of Muslims belong to mystical Sufi 
orders, including the Bektashi Sufi order, which is represented by the majority of ethnic 
Albanians in the Balkans, but also in Kosovo.161 Despite the different religious 
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affiliations, ethnic Albanians have traditionally used their Albanian national identity as a 
unifying force and have always promoted religious tolerance.  
After the 1999 Kosovo war, however, conservative and militant interpretations of 
Islam started to proliferate, particularly Salafism.162 Most of the research on Kosovo’s 
foreign fighters attributes the increase of radical ideology, such as Salafism, and their 
tendency to join extremist groups like ISIS to the proliferation of foreign charities and 
religious associations from Persian Gulf countries, especially from Saudi Arabia, and 
from Egypt.163 Their increased presence in the region, however, is closely linked to the 
financial support these countries have provided after the negative socio-economic effects 
of the 1998–1999 Kosovo conflict. A 2005 study on the proliferation of foreign and 
conservative interpretations of Islam in Kosovo indicates that various Saudi-funded 
charity organizations have mostly operated in Kosovo under the umbrella of the Saudi 
Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRCKC).164 Additionally, a 2010 
U.S. Congressional testimony claims that: 
[T]he Saudi royal family adopted a similar approach [as in Bosnia] when 
confronted with the parallel crisis in 1999 … in the tiny province of 
Kosovo. Under the chairmanship of Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif 
bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the Kingdom formed the Saudi Joint Relief 
Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya [SJRCKC] in order to better 
coordinate Saudi charitable work abroad. A key function of the Saudi Joint 
Committee was to coordinate the efforts of other Wahhabi-style 
missionary groups with loose ties to the Saudi government, including the 
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, al-Haramain al-Masjid al-Aqsa Charity 
Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), the 
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Muslim World League (MWL), al-Waqf al Islami, and the World 
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).165 
Moreover, the 2005 study identifies that most Western secular NGOs and the 
Kosovo government’s developmental programs failed to appropriately focus on rural 
areas of Kosovo, leaving them open to Saudi-funded NGOs to fill the void.166 Islamic 
NGOs engage in a range of development projects, including mosques, education, 
healthcare, and basic life needs, essentially controlling all the services that should be the 
duty of the central government.167 The author of the study, Isa Blumi, also adds that “the 
efficiency of the SJRCKC shows a sophisticated and global agenda, similar to an 
international corporation working to dominate the market [with its own brand].”168 
Additionally, one organization, al-Waqf al Islami, developed an estimated 30 madrassas, 
or Islamic schools, for children over three years of age throughout Kosovo, and more 
than 98 schools for elementary and secondary education; overall, these schools are in 
better shape and have more resources than the government-run ones, including free room 
and board.169 Critically, these schools teach the Salafi understanding of Islam, in addition 
to offering classes in English and computer science. 
In November 2015, the Kosovo government closed between 14 and 16 NGOs 
suspected of facilitating radicalization, recruitment, and financing of terrorist 
organizations such as ISIS. Among these NGOs was the al-Waqf al Islami along with 
several local charities and associations run by Kosovo clerics. At the same time, the 
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Kosovo government arrested several imams.170 For example, the imam Zekeria Qazimi 
was arrested and sentenced to ten years for radicalizing and facilitating recruitment of 
foreign fighters to ISIS.171 Furthermore, Qazimi is credited with influencing both 
Lavderim Muhaxheri and Ridvan Haqifi, who were the two most prominent leaders of 
ethnic Albanians in ISIS (currently reported to have been killed in Iraq and Syria).172 
Moreover, from court proceedings and foreign fighters’ statements, both Muhaxheri and 
Haqifi, once with ISIS, were in continuous contact with imam Qazimi to facilitate travel 
of foreign fighters from Kosovo to Syria and Iraq.173  Thus, under the guise of providing 
social assistance or religious teachings, these Islamic NGOs have been used for 
indoctrination, radicalization, and for building networks and relationships that have 
facilitated recruitment of Kosovo Albanians to join ISIS.  
Within these networks of radicalism, another dimension that is visible among the 
Kosovo foreign fighters is the role that family ties have played in radicalization. In one 
instance, a family of ten individuals comprised of three brothers, with wives and children, 
traveled to Syria and Iraq in September 2014.174 Similarly, Ridvan Haqifi’s two younger 
brothers joined ISIS; the youngest was 19 at the time of travel in 2013. All three brothers 
are reported to have died in Iraq.175  
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3. Global Jihad and ISIS Propaganda  
Foreign fighters from Kosovo in particular, but also ethnic Albanians throughout 
the Balkans, cannot be fully explained without investigating the role of ISIS propaganda, 
specifically propaganda that builds strong narratives on the idea of the caliphate, and the 
concept of martyrdom. The majority of Kosovo foreign fighters, especially families of 
foreign fighters that traveled to Syria and Iraq during the 2014–2015 time frame, are 
believed to have traveled after the proclamation of the caliphate and because of ISIS’s 
effective propaganda campaigns encouraging Muslims around the world to join the 
caliphate. 
In June 2014 after Friday prayers, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, 
addressed all Muslims of the world and called for them to recognize him as the 
khalifleaderof the newly proclaimed Khilafah, a unified polity of all Muslims around 
the world under Islamic law.176 In his 20-minute speech, the new Khalif outlined key 
messages to all Muslims and his vision for his new Islamic State: 
O Muslims everywhere … Raise your head high, for today – by Allah’s 
grace – you have a state and Khilafah…. It is a state where the Arab and 
non-Arab, the white man and black man, the easterner and westerner are 
all brothers. It is a khilāfah that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese, 
Shami, Iraqi, Yemeni, Egyptian, Maghribi (North African), American, 
French, German, and Australian…. Their blood mixed and became one, 
under a single flag and goal.... The State is a state for all Muslims. The 
land is for the Muslims, all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever 
is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let 
him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory…. This is my 
advice to you. If you hold to it, you will conquer Rome and own the 
world, if Allah wills.177 
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Calling for all Muslims around the world to migrate to fulfill a religious duty and 
the ultimate ambition to “conquer Rome and own the world” reflects the global vision 
and goals of ISIS. His speech set the stage for the major propaganda themes that ISIS has 
successfully used in its online and local recruitment efforts. Four messages have strongly 
appealed to the foreign fighters from Kosovo in particular, but also the rest of ethnic 
Albanian foreign fighters from the Balkans region: 1) the establishment of the caliphate 
under full sharia law; 2) the religious obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah, 
conduct jihad, and achieve eternal salvation through martyrdom; 3) the perception that 
Muslims are under attack from the West; and 4) the appeal of jihadist adventure and 
brotherhood.178  
Charlie Winter, a researcher on terrorism and insurgency with expertise in 
strategic communication, has focused his research on ISIS’s online and offline 
propaganda. In particular, he collected and categorized data on ISIS propaganda for a 30-
day period from different outlets and platforms, as shown in Figure 8. Within this 30-day 
propaganda campaign, the four propaganda themes mentioned in the previous paragraph 
are clearly visible.  
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Figure 8. 30-day media content by topic, 17 July to 15 August 2015.179 
The first message, the establishment of the caliphate under sharia law, has strong 
appeal to Kosovar foreign fighters who traveled with their family or were joined by their 
families at a later stage. The pictures in Figure 9 are snapshots of ISIS propaganda 
depicting various social activities.180   
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Figure 9. Photos from daily life in ISIS-held territories181 
The propaganda effort portrays that the caliphate in ISIS-held territories gives a 
better alternative for foreign fighters and their families than their current living conditions 
under non-Islamic or Western-influenced governments. Further, ISIS’s use of pictures 
and videos that depict social, economic, governance, and daily life events inside ISIS-
held territories portrays the caliphate as a legitimate state.  
The second and third messagesabout emigration (hijrah) as a religious 
obligation and protecting Muslims against the Weststrongly appeal to the believers 
who are strictly indoctrinated into extremist ideology, specifically jihadi Salafism. In a 
20-minute video published in June 2015 by ISIS’ Al-Hayat Official English News Media, 
ISIS fighters representing Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo call 
on their Muslim countrymen to conduct hijrah to join the Khilafah and fight Western 
invaders (see snapshot in Figure 10).  
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Figure 10. Snapshot of a propaganda video targeting Balkan Muslims.182 
Additionally, the call to conduct hijrah and protect the caliphate from the West 
specifically appeals to Kosovo ethnic Albanians, but also the rest of ethnic Albanians in 
the Balkans. These narratives build on the suffering from the Kosovo conflict, 
communism, and the treatment of ethnic Albanians during the Balkan wars, World War I, 
and World War II.  
The fourth message—the appeal of jihad and the camaraderie it brings—appeals 
to the fulfillment of the desire to belong as part of a tight and strong brotherhood. Winter 
argues that this message is especially attractive to the younger generation of foreign 
fighters, the majority of whom tend to be less indoctrinated and not very knowledgeable 
about religion. This demographic also tends to suffer from identity crises and the desire 
to be part of something bigger, particularly with non-married, childless groups of 
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radicalized Muslim youth. Winter concludes that the depiction of the caliphate as a place 
of brotherhood and close community is a very strong recruitment method for the 
sidelined and radicalized younger generations.183  
D. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to identify the factors that have influenced ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo to be radicalized in general and to join violent extremist 
organizations such as ISIS more specifically. The analysis showed that several factors 
have caused a contingent of about 400 Kosovar Albanians, including women and 
children, to travel to Syria and Iraq and join ISIS.  
First, several socio-economic conditions have helped the radicalization process. 
The 1999 Kosovo war’s negative consequences on the socio-economic conditions of 
Kosovo Albanians, coupled with the continuous inability of the Kosovo government to 
address individual and community grievances, especially in the rural areas of the country, 
are a source of grievances for many young Kosovars. In particular, the 15–34 age group 
in Kosovo is at high risk of employment, making them susceptible to radicalization and 
violent behavior. More importantly, the data on the foreign fighter contingent showed 
that individuals between the ages of 15 and 34 years, who represent about 76–80% of the 
total foreign fighters, were unemployed at the time of travel to Syria and Iraq.184 This, 
however, does not indicate that all the individuals within this age group traveled to ISIS 
because of poor economic conditions. Nonetheless, poor economic conditions and lack of 
employment opportunities are risk factors for radicalization and violent behavior.  
Second, these socio-economic challenges in Kosovo have provided opportunities 
for foreign religious charities from Gulf Statesparticularly Saudi Arabiato 
proselytize a fundamentalist and conservative version of Islam, thus beginning the 
cognitive radicalization of thousands of Kosovars. More critically, these charities have 
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provided religious scholarships for educating young Kosovo Albanians as imams in Arab 
countries. Upon return they have continued to proselytize a radical interpretation of 
Islam, such as Salafism. Among these radical imams, some have preached Salafi 
jihadism, which justifies violence for protection of the faith. Additionally, some charities, 
under the guise of providing human relief assistance to areas in need, have served as 
nodes of radicalization, financing, and recruitment for violent extremist organizations 
such as ISIS.  
Third, effective ISIS propaganda has appealed to ideological, social, and moral 
settings of the various target groups and has served as a catalyst for their decision to 
travel to ISIS, to protect and live in the caliphate. There is no sufficient evidence to 
conclude that ISIS propaganda has directly influenced Albanian foreign fighters from 
Kosovo. ISIS propaganda, however, most likely has strengthened local radical imams’ 
preaching and recruiting narratives and as a consequence have helped inspire the decision 
of many ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to join ISIS. Four broad propaganda themes were 
identified: 1) the establishment of the caliphate under full sharia law; 2) the religious 
obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah, conduct jihad, and achieve eternal 
salvation through martyrdom; 3) the perception that Muslims are under attack from the 
West; and 4) the appeal of jihadist adventure and brotherhood.185  
The next chapter looks at radicalization trends in Albania, using the radicalization 
model proposed in Chapter II to analyze the case.  
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IV. ALBANIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Official Albanian sources report that, since the start of the conflict in Syria in 
2011, approximately 114 individuals from Albania have traveled to Syria and Iraq, 
initially joining the Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Nusra, and later ISIS.186 Media reports and 
research that focus on the issue of foreign fighters originating from Albania, however, 
bring this number to approximately 140–150 individuals.187 Within this group, 13–24 
individuals are believed to be adult women and 31–35 of them were children at the time 
of travel.188 Enri Hide, a researcher and expert on extremism and terrorism based in 
Albania, claims that the majority of the Albania’s foreign fighters traveled to ISIS-held 
territories between 2013 and 2014. Moreover, among the 48 individuals who have 
returned to Albania, some of them have traveled more than once to ISIS-held territories 
in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, Hide finds that, after 2015, no Albanian citizens are 
believed to have traveled to ISIS-held territories.189 He attributes the decline of Albania’s 
foreign fighter travel to various factors, but most importantly to the Albanian 
government’s 2014 counterterrorism efforts that focused on preventing the flow of 
foreign fighters to ISIS. As part of this effort, the government apprehended, prosecuted, 
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and sentenced seven to nine members of a foreign fighter recruitment ring that facilitated 
the travel of at least 70 foreign fighters from Albania to ISIS territories.190 Among those 
arrested were Bujar Hysa and Genci Balla, two radical “self-declared” imams not 
recognized by the official Albanian Muslim Community (KMSH).191  
From a legal perspective, since 2015, the Albanian government has improved and 
updated the legal framework for prosecuting Albanian citizens who participate, facilitate 
participation, or call others to participate in foreign conflicts, such as the Syrian war.192 
As importantly, in 2015 the government also adopted the National Strategy for 
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and the Plan of Action to prevent radicalization 
and violent extremism in Albania.193 Additionally, in January 2018, the government 
created the Center for Countering Violent Extremism (CCVE) for “coordinating, creating 
and monitoring projects, activities, policies, and procedures to prevent radicalization, de-
radicalize, and re-integrate Albanian citizens.”194 A positive aspect of this strategy and 
plan of action is that it provides a framework for a whole of government and society 
approach to address radicalization in general and violent extremism in particular. Within 
the measures proposed in the CCVE Plan of Action, the Albanian government plans to 
address various socio-economic factors, including education and employment, countering 
extremist propaganda, and focusing all CVE efforts and engagements at the local 
community level.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows: The first section explores the demographic 
composition of the Albanian foreign fighter group, focusing on elements such as age, 
residence, and socio-economic status. The second section recaps the analytical 
framework proposed in Chapter II and then uses this framework to identify the various 
factors that have created favorable conditions for ideological or cognitive radicalization 
of Albanian citizens. Particularly, it explores socio-economic factors such as 
unemployment and education as variables that may create favorable environments for 
cognitive radicalization. Then the third section looks at the role of foreign Islamic 
charities and NGOs, radical Islamic clerics and leaders, recruitment networks, and ISIS 
online propaganda as factors that have enabled violent radicalization of Albanian foreign 
fighters. The final section provides a summary of the chapter.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF ALBANIA’S FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS  
Unlike Kosovo, Albanian official and non-official research of foreign fighters 
does not provide detailed statistics on this group. This gap in information prevents the 
creation of an accurate and detailed picture of Albania’s foreign fighter contingent based 
on age group, place of residence, and socio-economic status at time of travel to ISIS. 
Nonetheless, various recent research and reports on the phenomenon of Albania’s foreign 
fighters provide some useful general demographic facts to facilitate the analysis of the 
phenomenon for the rest of the chapter.  
Data on the ages of Albania’s foreign fighters at the time of travel to ISIS-held 
territories, in contrast to Kosovo, are not available at the individual level. However, 
various sources identify that children under the age of 15 years old totaled between 31 
and 35 individuals, whereas adult women over 15 years old numbered between 13 and 24 
individuals. The rest of the foreign fighter contingent consists of adult males over 15 
years of age, approximately 90 individuals, or 60 % of the foreign fighter contingent. 
Hide’s 2017 study identifies that 48 foreign fighters have returned to Albania, mainly 
adult men. Furthermore, the report states that, in addition to at least 23 foreign fighters 
who are reported to have been killed, 78 individuals still remain in Syria and Iraq. 
Among these, 20 individuals are involved in combat, whereas the remaining 58 are 
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women and children.195 These numbers suggest that all the women and children who left 
Albania still remain with ISIS and imply that none of the families that traveled to ISIS 
territories have returned to Albania. 
According to a 2011 census, Albania has a population of approximately 2.9 
million, of which about 59% are Muslim, including Sufi orders such as the Bektashi sect. 
Albania’s foreign fighter recruitment rate is about nine foreign fighters per 100,000 
Muslims (see Table 5). This figure is much lower when compared to Kosovo’s and the 
Republic of North Macedonia’s foreign fighter recruitment rate of 21 and 23 foreign 
fighters per 100,000 Muslim citizens, respectively.196 
Table 5. Albania’s foreign fighter recruitment rates.197 
Albania’s Foreign Fighter recruitment, including women and 
children (max 150 foreign fighters taken as basis of 
calculation) 
Albania Total population (in million)* 2.907368 
Albania Muslim Population (in million)* 1.715347 
Per 100,000 Muslims 9 
Per 10,000 Muslims** 0.9 
Per 100,000 General population  5 
Per 10,000 General population** 0.5 
Notes: *based on 2011 census, **reduced the unit to 10,000 to facilitate 
comparison of areas with population lower than 100,000 
 
Furthermore, the recruitment of foreign fighters is not confined to just one part of 
Albania. There are certain areas, however, that seem to be more vulnerable and have 
provided a relatively higher proportion of foreign fighters per capita. Figure 11 provides 
an overview of the different municipalities in Albania.  
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Figure 11.  Geographic distribution of Albania’s foreign fighters by district.198  
Specifically, the majority of foreign fighters originated from rural areas of Kukes, 
Dibra, Elbasan, Librazhd, and Pogradec municipalities, but also from suburban areas of 
larger municipalities, including Tirana, Durres, or Vlora.199 Exact numbers for each of 
these regions are not available; however, most of the research points to three adjacent 
villages of Leshnice, Gurras, and Remenj in the district of Pogradec as having a large 
proportion of foreign fighters when compared to the national average. Foreign fighters 
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from these three villages total 24 individuals, including women and children.200 Exact 
data for these three villages are not available; however, all three villages are part of a 
larger administrative unit, Bucimas, which includes several other villages around the 
larger city of Pogradec. The population of Bucimas is approximately 15,687. Whereas the 
Muslim population is approximately 76.80%, or 12,048 total.201  The recruitment rate of 
foreign fighters within this area is at least 20 times higher than the national average 
recruitment rate per 10,000 Muslim Albanians. See Table 5 and Table 6.  
Table 6. Foreign fighter recruitment rate from Bucimas, Pogradec.202 
Bucimas Administrative unit 
(Leshnice, Gurras, Remenj, and other villages) 
Population total 15,687 
Muslim Population (76.80%) 12,048 
Total Foreign Fighters (from the three villages) 24 
Recruitment rate for 10,000 general population 15 
Recruitment rate for 10,000 Muslim population 20 
 
Thus, despite the fact that accurate data on foreign fighters from Albania are not 
currently accessible at an individual level, the general data still show that the foreign 
fighter phenomenon is widespread throughout the country, and the relatively high rate of 
foreign fighters is observed specifically in rural areas and underdeveloped suburban areas 
of major cities. Based on the previous discussions, the following sections of the chapter 
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investigate several factors as potential causes of ideological radicalization in general and 
violent radicalization in particular among Albania’s foreign fighters.  
C. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION IN ALBANIA 
The radicalization model, proposed in Chapter II, provides a useful lens to 
investigate the various factors that have caused Albanian citizens to become ideologically 
radicalized; accept fundamentalist Islamic ideologies, such as Salafism; and decide to 
join violent extremist organizations, such as ISIS. More precisely, the model suggests, 
initially, studying the socio-economic and political factors that create settings for 
radicalization of Albanian citizens in general. Then it drive the investigation of various 
religious mobilization resources that have influenced and continue to influence cognitive 
Islamic radicalization initially, and at a later stage, violent radicalization, including 
participation in violent extremist organizations such as ISIS.  
Building off of this three-part model, the rest of this section is organized in three 
subsections. The first investigates socio-economic factors, including unemployment and 
education, as sources of grievances among Albanian citizens, creating favorable 
conditions for radicalization in general. Then, in the second subsection, religious 
resources, such as foreign Islamic NGOs and charities with ties to Persian Gulf countries, 
are evaluated as sources of proselytizing a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, such as 
Salafism, in Albania. Additionally, this subsection evaluates religious factors such as 
radical Islamic leaders and clerics, recruitment networks, and family and friendship 
relationships as sources of violent radicalization. Lastly, the third subsection discusses 
the role that online propaganda from ISIS has had in violent radicalization and 
recruitment of Albania’s foreign fighters.  
1. Grievances among Albania’s Foreign Fighters 
In the beginning of the 1990s, Albania began a political and economic transition 
phase from communism to liberal democracy. It emerged as the poorest country in 
Europe at that time and continues to be one of the four poorest countries in Europe in per 
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capita GDP, only ahead of Kosovo, Ukraine, and Moldova.203 A 1999 study of the 
economic performance of Albania finds that, for the first five years of the democratic 
transition (1991–1996), Albania had the highest yearly increase of GDP in Europe.204 
This progress in the economy, however, was severely disrupted by the breakdown of the 
“pyramidal investment schemes” in January and February of 1997.205 Albanian-owned 
private companies as early as 1991, claiming they operated corporate holdings, began 
running fraudulent investment schemes.206 Some of the larger companies did invest in 
the private sector; however, smaller ones did not do so.207  In simple terms, these corrupt 
schemes relied on new client deposits to pay off returns from high investment rates for 
older clients. Within this logic, the increasing demand for paying old depositor’s earnings 
requires new clients to deposit more money.208 With some of these companies offering 
as much as a 50% return on investment, many Albanians sold their houses and properties 
to benefit from the schemes.209 However, by the end of 1996, some of these companies 
could not make payments and declared bankruptcy.210 This last condition occurred in 
Albania during the first months of 1997, spurring a wave of protests and violent 
responses by the government that eventually led to the 1997 Albanian Armed Revolt.211 
Besides the negative economic effects from these corrupt investment schemes, sudden 
social and political unrest in the country caused the death of at least 2,000 citizens, 
destruction of private and government infrastructure, and the looting of weapons and 
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ammunition from military and police installations. In April 1997, the UN Security 
Council authorized “Operation Alba,” composed of 7,000 military troops from 11 
countries, with the aim of restoring order in the three months that followed until a new 
government was elected and constituted.212  
Following the 1997 crisis, the political and economic situation in Albania began 
to stabilize. Positive economic trends resulted in a reduction of the national 
unemployment rate from 1991 to 2018. In 2018 the national average unemployment was 
approximately 13.4%. See Figure 12.213  
 
Figure 12.  National unemployment rate, 1991–2017.214 
This relatively low level of unemployment as compared to the rest of the Balkans, 
however, can be attributed in part to the reclassification of farmers who own land as 
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“self-employed.” A study suggests that following the post-communist land reform, 
centralized cooperative land was distributed to farmers, whom the government then did 
not include in unemployment statistics.215  
Nonetheless, if national unemployment is analyzed by age group, it is possible to 
identify the categories that are the most at risk of unemployment. The data from Albanian 
Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) show that, in 2017, the 15–24 age group and 25–29 age 
group are the most at risk for unemployment with 31.9% and 20.55 % unemployment 
rates, respectively. See Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13.  Youth and young adults (15–29 years old) percent unemployment in 
Albania.216 
More importantly, within these two age groups, the share of unemployment for a 
period of more than 12 months is 47.1% for the 15–24 age group and 62.3% for 24–29 
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age group.217 Additionally, if educational attainment and unemployment are considered 
for these age groups together, the analysis shows that unemployment is relatively the 
same, no matter the level of education. For example, in 2017, for the 15–29 age group, 
29% of those unemployed have only eight-to-nine years of education total, 30.5 % of 
those unemployed have only a high school education (12 years), and 29.8% of those 
unemployed have at least a college degree. See Figure 14.218  
 
Figure 14.  Unemployment by education level for 15–29 age group, 2010–2017.219 
Thus, for those between 15 and 29 years old, high levels of unemployment, no 
matter the level of education, could be a source of grievance and discontent. Furthermore, 
this same age group also experiences high inequality in socio-economic status within and 
between rural, suburban, and urban areas throughout the country, which could serve as a 
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source of discontent among Albanian citizens in general, but also among the foreign 
fighters in particular. Increasing grievances and discontent throughout Albania creates the 
potential for radicalization and violence to manifest in different forms such as crime, 
political radicalization, and violence, as well as religious ideological radicalization, such 
as Islamic fundamentalism, and violent radicalization, and may include joining Salafi 
jihadist groups like ISIS.  
Detailed data on the socio-economic conditions, such as unemployment and level 
of education of the foreign fighter contingent are currently not accessible. As a result, no 
definite conclusions can be made regarding the specific sources of grievances among the 
foreign fighters. Nonetheless, a 2015 study from the Institute for Democracy and 
Mediation, based in Albania, provides the most comprehensive approach in investigating 
the factors of religious radicalism and violent extremism in Albania. The key aspect of 
the study is that it uses surveys and interviews with target groups among the general 
population from areas throughout Albania that have been affected more by the foreign 
fighter phenomenon.220 Specifically, the authors of the study focused their research on 
eight different zones, including the administrative unit of Bucimas, which is one of the 
areas with the highest foreign fighter recruitment rate per capita. See Figure 11 and 
Figure 15.221  
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Figure 15. Target areas of the 2017 study on religious radicalization and violent 
extremism in Albania.222 
Bucimas is a rural area with a total population of 15,687, with 76.80% of 
residents identifying as Muslim, 2% as Christian Orthodox, 0.6% as Christian Catholic, 
and 0.2% from the Bektashi Muslim Sufi Order.223 Data on education show that 4.7% 
have a maximum of four years of education, 58.53% have a maximum of eight-to-nine 
years of education, 30.83% are high school graduates or have 12 years of education, and 
only 5.94% have a college education.224 The average unemployment rate in Bucimas is 
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54.70%. Moreover, 78.80% of youth and young adults between the ages of 15 and 30 are 
unemployed.225  
In recent years, another factor that has contributed to this high level of 
unemployment is the return of economic migrants following the 2008 global economic 
crisis, particularly from Greece and Italy, two top destinations of Albanian migrant 
workers.226 The exact number of migrants that returned to Bucimas is difficult to 
determine; however, there are two cases of foreign fighters who had worked in Greece 
and Italy before joining ISIS. Both foreign fighters were 25 years old when they traveled 
to ISIS-held territories in 2013. In a news report, the father of one of the foreign fighters 
claims that radicalization of his son occurred at least three years before his departure and 
blames his son’s radicalization on the village imam, Almir Daci, a cleric who himself 
traveled to ISIS and became a key ISIS commander for foreign fighters from Albania 
until he was declared dead in 2017.227 
Thus, lack of employment opportunities and perceptions of a grim economic 
future may have been among some of the various sources of discontent and frustration 
among the general population, including especially those between the ages of 15 and 29. 
This frustration can be manifested in various forms, including accepting fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam in general and deciding to join ISIS in particular, as is suggested 
by the 24 individuals from three villages in Bucimas. As mentioned previously, though, 
exact socio-economic data on the entire foreign fighter contingent are not accessible. 
Thus a causal relationship between poor socio-economic conditions and radicalization 
cannot be established with certainty. Still, the general socio-economic inequalities and 
differences between rural, suburban, and urban areas in the country provide a plausible 
explanation for creating favorable conditions for other factors and players that have 
caused ideological radicalization, and later, violent radicalization. Socio-economic 
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factors alone do not explain the path to radicalization, however. It is also necessary to 
consider religious resources that have contributed to the radicalization process. First, 
however, it is important to understand how fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, such 
as Salafism, established roots and continue to proliferate in Albania, which traditionally 
has practiced and continues to predominantly practice the moderate Hanafi interpretation 
of Islam.228 
2. Mobilization of Religious Resources  
According to the 2011 census, 58.79% of Albanians identify themselves as 
Muslim (including 2.09% Sufi from the Bektashi Order), 10.03% Roman Catholic, 6.75% 
Christian Orthodox, 0.2% other Christian denominations, and about 13.8% 
undeclared.229 Despite this mix of religious identities, Hide argues that Albanians have 
always promoted religious tolerance and harmony, placing ethnic identity as the most 
important element of national identity.230 Yet, after the fall of communism and the 
establishment of the first liberal democratic government, Salafism started to emerge and 
proliferate as a new religious orientation among Albanian citizens. In Albania, this 
fundamentalist interpretation of Islam is attributed mainly to two broad factors: 1) 
political opportunities in Albania and the Balkans at large, and 2) the need for financial 
capital or foreign direct investment to improve Albania’s economic infrastructure 
inherited from the communist era.231  
First, the change in political opportunities in Albania is important for 
understanding the rise of more radical understandings of Islam. More specifically, in 
1992 the new government enlisted Albania as a member of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference for the purpose of getting access to the financial capital from the oil-
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rich Islamic countries of the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The financial aid that followed from these Islamic 
countries, however, came with political agendas that introduced ideologically based 
cognitive radicalization, including Salafism in general, but also violent radicalization. For 
example, in 1992, the Albanian government gave Kuwait permission to build mosques in 
exchange for providing developmental aid.232 Similarly, the Islamic Developmental 
Bank (IDB) provided much needed financial investment in various sectors of the 
Albanian economy, but also created infrastructure for Arabic language education and 
provided religious scholarships in Muslim countries for young Albanians.233 As mosques 
and religious institutions started to proliferate, demand for imams, religious teachers, and 
clergy increased also. The Albanian-Islamic Bank, founded in 1994, provided even more 
scholarships for Albanian citizens to study in Islamic countries in the Persian Gulf to 
become imams. Additionally, this bank and other Islamic charities and NGOs 
continuously financed the travel of many Albanian Muslims for pilgrimages to Mecca, 
but also provided donations to poor families under the condition that women wear 
hijab.234  
Perhaps more importantly, the violent break-up of the Yugoslav Republic, 
including the Bosnian civil war from 1992 to 1995 and the Kosovo conflict in 1999, 
provided the political opportunity for Islamic jihadists to move into the Balkans under the 
guise of NGOs and charities providing humanitarian and developmental assistance, and 
to protect the Muslim faith in the Balkans. Christopher Deliso, an author with expertise in 
South East Europe, argues that the network of these so-called charities conducted 
activities such as money laundering, weapons trafficking, and providing refuge for 
jihadists and terrorists under the cover of legal workers for these charities and NGOs.235  
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After the 9/11 attacks, the Albanian authorities, with assistance from the U.S. 
Government, closed down various NGOs and seized financial assets and key individuals 
within these organizations. For example, one of these charities, Muwafaq Foundation, 
which is headed by the Saudi businessman Yassin Al Qadi, is currently on the United 
States’ and UN’s terrorist list for financing terrorism.236 Another charity, International 
Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), provided cover also for the brother of Ayman al 
Zawahiri, Mohammed al-Zawahiri, to be the head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 
Albania. The Albanian government detained and extradited members of this group to 
Egypt to be tried for terrorist activities in what was generally known as the process of 
“returnees from Albania.”237  
Other Islamic NGOs and charities not tied to terrorism, however, continued the 
agenda of proselytizing Salafism through infrastructure building, education, and other 
social services for communities in need throughout Albania. Furthermore, the new imams 
and clerics who finished their education in Middle Eastern countries returned to Albania 
with the mission of propagating Salafism in contrast to the traditional Hanafi 
interpretation of Islam, which was the only interpretation accepted by the KMSH.238  
Leonie Vrugtman, a researcher who focuses on various security issues including 
radicalism and violent extremism, quoting an Albanian official, writes that as of 2015 
approximately 200 mosques throughout Albania, out of a total of 727, did not fulfill 
regulations required by KMSH. More importantly, in 2015, Albania’s State Intelligence 
Services (SHISH) reported to a parliamentary committee that at least 89 mosques were 
outside KMSH control.239 Within these groups of mosques some have served as violent 
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radicalization and recruitment sites for the Albanian foreign fighters. More specifically, 
Vrugtman notes that two mosques in the suburbs of Tirana were under the control of two 
imams arrested by the Albanian government for involvement in a foreign fighter 
recruitment ring in Tirana.240 Radical cleric Bujar Hysa, the imam of one of the two 
mosques, was sentenced in 2016 to 18 years in prison on terrorism charges, specifically 
for radicalizing, facilitating recruitment, and preaching statements that promoted 
violence. In a national media interview from prison, Hysa outlined some important 
contributions that foreign charities have played in radicalization in general. He confirms 
that a donation from a Kuwaiti charity, under the umbrella of the larger Kuwaiti based 
Revival of Islamic heritage Society (RIHS), made possible the construction of the 
mosque in 2004.241 In 2008 U.S Department of the Treasury named this charity a 
terrorist financing organization. Since then, the U.S. Department of Treasury finds that 
activities of the branches of this charity in Albania and the rest of the Balkans have 
continued by changing the names of organizations and channeling finances to other less 
suspected charities.242  
Hysa has denied being a terrorist, and he denies having any financial or monetary 
connections in facilitating radicalized Albanian foreign fighters to travel to ISIS-held 
territories. On the other hand, he claims that he has regularly preached in his mosque for 
those devout Muslims who have the means to support the effort in any fashion, including 
physical jihad for protecting Muslims and the Muslim faith.243  
Similarly, the role of radical cleric Almir Daci, the imam of the only mosque in 
one of the three villages in South-East Albania, is believed to have been crucial in 
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facilitating violent radicalization and recruitment of Albanians to join ISIS; this area has 
one of the highest foreign fighter rates in the country. In April 2016, the Albanian 
government declared Daci killed in combat; despite this, the Albanian government 
sentenced him, in absentia and post mortem, for terrorism charges. During court 
proceedings, communication between Daci and the two radical imams, Hysa and Balla, 
was presented as proof of their involvement in facilitating and encouraging the travel of 
Albanian citizens to ISIS.244 
The roles of kinship, friendship, and family also are equally important in 
explaining a high concentration of Albania’s foreign fighters, especially in small 
communities like the three villages in Bucimas. For example, the case of the two 25-year-
olds mentioned previously, who joined ISIS, were close friends prior to becoming 
economic migrants and returning to the village of Leshnica where Daci preached. The 
decision to travel together was likely influenced by this close association. Additionally, 
no single women from Albania traveled to ISIS alone; this suggests that the women and 
children who traveled to ISIS did so mainly because of their husbands’ and fathers’ 
decision to join ISIS.245  
3. Global Jihad and ISIS Propaganda  
A high proportion of Albania’s foreign fighters traveled during the 2013 to 2014 
time frame. This period coincides with ISIS consolidating its power and declaring the 
caliphate in June 2014.246 The propaganda campaign that followed may be one of the 
causes in catalyzing the decision of ideologically radicalized Salafist Muslims around the 
world, including Albania, to join the caliphate. As described in Chapter III, the 
propaganda themes and messages that have influenced ideologically radicalized Albanian 
Muslims are the same as ethnic Albanian foreign fighters from Kosovo. The four 
propaganda themes: 1) the establishment of the caliphate under full sharia law; 2) 
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religious obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah, conduct jihad, and achieve 
eternal salvation through martyrdom; 3) that Muslims are under attack from the West; 
and 4) the appeal of jihadist adventure and brotherhood.247  
Similar to the Kosovo case, the first theme appeals to those who have traveled 
with their families to live under the caliphate as the legitimate state that should govern all 
Muslims under sharia law. The messages that Islam and Muslims are under attack and 
that they need to wage jihad to protect the faith and the faithful, the second and third 
messages, most likely appeal to Salafi jihadists who justify violence for protection of the 
faith. Lastly, the fourth message may have appeal for the younger generation of foreign 
fighters, who are less knowledgeable about the religion, but are motivated by other 
factors such as adventurism, belonging, or the desire to be part of something important to 
them.  
Yet, in order to make a definite causal relationship between ISIS propaganda and 
the increase of foreign fighters from Albania in the 2013–2014 period, a more detailed 
analysis of foreign fighters’ online access is necessary. A study like this would show if 
indeed ISIS online propaganda has directly influenced and encouraged a large portion of 
ideologically radicalized Albanian citizens to join ISIS. This line of research is, however, 
a much more challenging endeavor than collecting or obtaining detailed individual data 
about socio-economic conditions, which also currently are not readily accessible. 
Nonetheless, there is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that ISIS propaganda 
might have strengthened the recruiting narrative of radical imams and recruiters to 
influence their followers to either join ISIS or support ISIS’ cause with other means.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigated the factors that have influenced Albanian citizens to 
become radicalized in general, including their violent radicalization in particular, and 
their decision to join a violent extremist organization such as ISIS. The inquiry 
demonstrates that several factors have influenced approximately 150 Albanian citizens, 
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including women and children, to join ISIS. First, various political and socio-economic 
factors may have facilitated radicalization in general. A weak and volatile political life in 
the first years of post-communist Albania, in addition to the new liberal democratic 
government’s inability to address grievances such as poverty and unemployment, may 
have made certain communities in Albania vulnerable to radicalization and violent 
behavior, including crime, political violence, and Islamic radicalization.  
Second, these weak political and economic factors may have provided favorable 
circumstances for an increase in foreign assistance in Albania, including from Persian 
Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Lack of effective developmental 
policies, especially in rural and suburban areas of the country, coupled with episodes of 
conflict and political violence, such as the 1997 crisis and the outbreak of violence in 
Yugoslavia, provided favorable opportunities for various Islamic charities and NGOs to 
proliferate in Albania.  
Third, in exchange for providing financial aid, various foreign Islamic charities 
and NGOs built mosques and madrassas, donated cash to poor families, and provided 
religious scholarships in Muslim countries for hundreds of young Albanians. This new 
generation of clerics and imams, after being indoctrinated in fundamentalist ideologies 
such as Salafism, returned to Albania and have continued to proselytize these extreme 
understandings of Islam. As a consequence, they have radicalized many Albanian citizens 
and have established networks that have recruited foreign fighters. 
Finally, ISIS propaganda campaigns may have served as a catalyst for radicalized 
Albanian Muslims to join ISIS. Among the different propaganda themes and narratives, 
the following may have appealed to Albania’s foreign fighters in particular: the caliphate 
under sharia law representing the only arrangement for all Muslims; emigrating (hijrah) 
to the caliphate as an obligation; conducting jihad to protect the faith and the Muslim 
lands from the West; and the caliphate providing a place of belonging and brotherhood, 
giving individuals the opportunity to be part of something bigger.  
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The following chapter utilizes the radicalization model proposed in Chapter II to 




V. REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
Research that focuses on foreign fighters originating from the Republic of North 
Macedonia estimates that between 110 and 156 citizens traveled to Syria and Iraq since 
the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.248 Within this group, approximately 14 are 
reported to be women. No cases of children have been reported so far, despite the fact 
that three families have returned to North Macedonia from Syria and Iraq.249 In a 2018 
study, Filip Stojkovski and Natasia Kalajdziovskiresearchers based in Northern 
Macedoniaestimate that, as of the end of 2017, 41 individuals, including four women, 
remain with ISIS. The same report identifies that 33 individuals have been killed and that 
80–86 individuals have returned to North Macedonia, including three women and three 
other families.250 Moreover, Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski identify in another study that 
foreign fighters originating from North Macedonia had stopped traveling to ISIS held 
territories by 2017. Both authors attribute this decline to the government’s newly updated 
counterterrorism policies but also to ISIS’s territorial losses251 that had started by the end 
of 2015.252 Additionally, Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski argue that the “disintegration” of 
ISIS removes the “foreign outlet” for violent extremists to channel their actions, thus 
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leaving the domestic arena within North Macedonia as a new potential target; either for 
violent attacks or for violent radicalization of others.253  
As early as 2015, the government of North Macedonia has conducted three major 
counterterrorism operations, code named “Cell,” that resulted in the sentencing of 11 
individuals on charges of radicalizing, recruiting foreign fighters, and participating in 
ISIS.254 Among those sentenced is a radical imam, Rexhep Memishi, who was identified 
as a key figure in facilitating radicalization and recruiting many foreign fighters to ISIS 
from North Macedonia.255 Moreover, in 2018, the North Macedonia government adopted 
a four-year plan for “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism” (P/CVE) in 
Macedonia. This strategy came later than those of Macedonia’s neighbors.256 Stojkovski 
and Kalajdziovski argue that, at the political level, key national leaders have determined 
that a broad ‘whole of society’ approach is necessary to address ideological radicalization 
and violent radicalization; however, pragmatically this is not visible within the P/CVE 
strategy. Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski assess that “[…] the strategy itself is insufficiently 
comprehensive, lacking in expertise, and predominantly focuses on the security and law 
enforcement aspects of P/CVEit does little to acknowledge that extremism 
[radicalization] and violent extremism [violent radicalization] are not just a security issue, 
but a social one as well.”257  
Thus, this chapter investigates various factors that have influenced ideologically-
based cognitive radicalization of ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia and their tendency 
to join violent extremist groups such as ISIS. It is structured as follows. The first section 
provides a general analysis of foreign fighters, focusing on characteristics such as 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, age, gender, and place of residence in North Macedonia. 
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The second section restates the radicalization framework proposed in Chapter II and, 
utilizing this framework, continues to explore the various factors that initially created 
favorable conditions for cognitive radicalization and, at a later stage, violent behavioral 
radicalization of ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia. More specifically, this second 
section of the chapter studies socio-economic factors such as unemployment, education, 
and ethnic minority rights under the lens of ethnic relations as factors that have created 
conducive environments for ideologically-based cognitive radicalization to emerge. 
Secondly, in the same section, the paper investigates the role of foreign Islamic charities 
and NGOs, radical leaders and imams, physical and online recruitment networks, and 
ISIS propaganda as factors that have influenced violent radicalization of some citizens of 
North Macedonia. The third and final section of the chapter concludes with a summary.  
B. DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF NORTH MACEDONIA’S 
FOREIGN FIGHTERS  
Similar to the case of Albania from the previous chapter, detailed information 
about individual foreign fighters from North Macedonia is not accessible. This lack of 
evidence hinders the development of an accurate analysis of the foreign fighters. 
Nonetheless, various research that focuses on the phenomenon of foreign fighters 
originating from North Macedonia provides some general facts to help inform the 
analysis that follows. 
The last country-wide census in North Macedonia was conducted in 2002. 
According to it, the country has a population of a little over two million citizens. By 
ethnicity, 64.17% of North Macedonia’s citizens identify as Macedonian, 25.17% as 
Albanian, 3.85% Turks, 2.66% Roma, 1.77% Serbs, 0.84% Bosnian, and 1.04% as other 
ethnicities.258 By religious affiliation, 64.6% of North Macedonia’s citizens identify 
themselves as Christian (Eastern Orthodox), 33.3% as Muslim, and 2% as other religious 
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sects.259 Among Muslims the majority, approximately 80–85%, are represented by ethnic 
Albanians, whereas the rest of the Muslim population is represented by ethnic Turks, 
Bosnians, Roma, and other minorities.260 If the foreign fighter recruitment rate in North 
Macedonia is calculated based on the Muslim population, then the results are 23 foreign 
fighters per 100,000 Muslims. This figure is higher than Kosovo and Albania with 21 and 
nine foreign fighters per 100,000 Muslim citizens, respectively (see Table 7).261  
Table 7. Occurrence of foreign fighters for every 100,000 Muslim citizens262 
Albania Kosovo* North Macedonia 
Total population (in millions) 2.907368 1.8 2.022547
Muslim population  (in millions) 1.715347 1.710000 0.674182
Total No. of foreign fighters 150 358 156
Foreign Fighters in 100,000 
Muslim citizens 9 21 23
*Note: For Kosovo the calculation of the foreign fighter rate does not include 40 children who were born 
in ISIS. Women and minors under age of 15 at the time of travel to ISIS are included in the calculation for 
all three countries. 
 
In their 2018 study, Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski found that most of the foreign 
fighters originated from communities that represent a minority ethnic Albanian 
population.263 There are also foreign fighters originating from areas where ethnic 
Albanians form the majority ethnic group; however, the phenomenon is less concentrated 
when compared to where they are an ethnic minority group.264 Figure 16 shows a general 
distribution of foreign fighters by place of origin in North Macedonia.  
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The blue circles are not to scale. They only show the main regions reported as places of 
origin of the majority of foreign fighters. 
Figure 16. General distribution of foreign fighters in North Macedonia according 
to regions (communes).265 
Specific numbers of foreign fighters for each region are not available; however, 
Skopje, the country’s capital city, and Kumanovo are two areas that have contributed a 
considerable number of foreign fighters.266 Skopje city and Kumanovo have an ethnic 
Albanian minority of 20.5% and 25.9%, respectively, whereas the regions of Tetovo, 
Gostivar, and Struga, which also have had foreign fighters, are ethnic Albanian majority 
regions with 70%, 67%, and 59% ethnic Albanians, respectively.267  
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Skopje city—with its ten municipalities—accounts for approximately 500,000 
citizens, or 25% of the total population of North Macedonia.268 Additionally, Skopje, in 
absolute numbers, accounts for the highest concentration of ethnic Albanians in the 
country.269 Nonetheless, in relation to ethnic Macedonians they form a minority group, 
albeit the largest minority group when compared to other minorities. Stojkovski and 
Kalajdziovski note that within Skopje, the municipalities of Cair, Saraj, and Gazi Baba, 
which have high ethnic Albanian populations, have contributed a large proportion of 
foreign fighters and are also at high risk of radicalization and violent extremism.270  
In regard to foreign fighters, specific demographic information such as age or 
socio-economic status is not available. A 2016 study, however, provides some specific 
details about 11 individuals arrested during counterterrorism operations conducted 
between 2015 and 2016.271 The individuals arrested and sentenced for facilitating and/or 
participating in foreign terrorist groups were between the ages of 22 and 38 at the time of 
their arrest and sentencing. Among them were three individuals who were employed at 
time of travel to ISIS, including a government employee.272  
The study also identifies five cases of women who either joined or attempted to 
join ISIS. The youngest of the women, from Kumanovo region, was 18 years old at time 
of travel. Additionally, according to statements from her father, this girl was in 
continuous contact with another girl from Kosovo who had joined ISIS. She also had 
videos from Iraq and Syria, and other propaganda videos were found on her personal 
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computer. Three other young girls, from rural areas of Skopje region, were stopped by 
their families before reaching ISIS-held territories.273  
In addition to these cases, there were two reported cases of ethnic Macedonians 
who had converted to Islam and joined ISIS, one male and one female.274  The ethnic 
Macedonian male, Stefan Stefanovski, was among those arrested during the “Cell” 
counterterrorism operation in August 2015 and subsequently sentenced to two years in 
prison.275 Stefanovski, a 32-year-old from Skopje, was a doctor from a well-established 
family and traveled to ISIS to provide medical help.276 The ethnic Macedonian female 
was radicalized in an unspecified Western European country. Before joining ISIS, 
however, she traveled back to her place of residence in Struga region.277 Apart from 
these two cases, most of the research identifies that the rest of the foreign fighters are 
from ethnic Albanian origins.278  
The details just presented show that multiple pathways to radicalization and 
violent extremism exist in North Macedonia. Additionally, the radicalization of two 
ethnic Macedonians shows that individuals or groups from different backgrounds, socio-
economic status, age, ethnicity, and so on are vulnerable to ideological and violent 
radicalization. Nonetheless, the rest of the paper focuses on ethnic Albanians specifically. 
The previous discussion shows that there is no overarching factor that has contributed to 
the ideological radicalization and violent radicalization of some ethnic Albanians of 
North Macedonia. Multiple factors are important to consider for a better understanding of 
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why so many ethnic Albanians in Macedonia accept radical Islamic ideologies and why 
some of them later violently radicalize and participate in violent extremist groups such as 
ISIS. Thus, the following sections of this chapter study various factors as potential causes 
of ideologically-based cognitive radicalization and also violent behavioral radicalization 
of ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia.  
C. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF RADICALIZATION IN NORTH MACEDONIA 
This section uses the radicalization model proposed in Chapter II to explore the 
various factors that have contributed to the ideological and violent radicalization of ethnic 
Albanians in North Macedonia, such as accepting radical Islamic ideology, particularly 
Salafism, and also joining violent extremist groups such as ISIS. The radicalization 
framework, first, proposes to investigate political and socio-economic factors that have 
provided an environment conducive for radicalization to develop. Then, it suggests 
studying multiple factors that, initially, have proliferated ideologically-based cognitive 
radicalization and at a later stage have facilitated violent behavioral radicalization, such 
as participation in violent extremist groups like ISIS.  
Thus, based on this model, the rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, it 
studies various political and socio-economic factors, such as ethnic marginalization and 
unemployment, as sources of grievances and discontent among ethnic Albanians in North 
Macedonia. Such factors may create environments conducive for radicalization to 
manifest in general. Then, the chapter investigates various sources of religious 
mobilization, such as foreign Islamic NGOs, especially those with links to Persian Gulf 
countries, as sources of proselytizing radical interpretations of Islam in North Macedonia. 
Additionally, the chapter studies the role of radical Islamic clerics, family and friendship 
relations, recruitment networks, and ISIS propaganda as factors that have contributed to 
violent behavioral radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters among ethnic 
Albanians in North Macedonia.  
1. Grievances among Ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia  
The Republic of North Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic that gained 
independence from Yugoslavia without a violent conflict during the 1991 to 1995 time 
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period.279 Since then, though, North Macedonia’s political and social life has been 
characterized by heightened ethnic tensions between the two major ethnic groups: the 
Macedonians and Albanians. These interethnic tensions culminated in the 2001 armed 
rebellion of ethnic Albanians, who demanded more political rights and the recognition of 
ethnic Albanians as a constituent of the Macedonian nation and not just a minority.280 
The international community intervened, preventing the conflict from escalating, and 
ended the crisis with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA), which was signed by the 
political leaders from both ethnicities in the city of Ohrid in South-West Macedonia on 
13 August 2001.281 The OFA laid the legal grounds for increasing ethnic minority rights, 
especially for ethnic Albanians as the largest ethnic minority in North Macedonia.282 The 
most critical changes that followed after the OFA agreement were that government power 
was decentralized, more political power was given to local municipalities, and ethnic 
languages became co-official with the Macedonian language in municipalities that were 
more than 20% ethnic minority.283 Despite these positive steps, however, ethnic, socio-
economic, and religious life in North Macedonia has remained highly contentious, 
divisive, and rife with the potential for the emergence of political radicalization, 
including religious radicalization and violence.  
Indicators at the national level, such as per capita GDP, show that North 
Macedonia is better off economically than Albania and Kosovo (see Figure 17).  
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Same as Figure 4 in Chapter III of this thesis 
Figure 17. 2017 GDP per capita in the Balkans.284 
  
Nevertheless, the World Bank estimates that at least 33% of the population is 
poor, with 8.7% extremely poor.285 Additionally, despite the positive trends in the 
decline of unemployment since independence from Yugoslavia, as of 2018, national level 
unemployment is at 20%. Among the unemployed, the 15–29 age group is the most at 
risk of unemployment, with a rate of 37.05% (see Figure 18).286  
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Figure 18. Unemployment rate by age group in North Macedonia.287 
At the sub-national level, Harley Johansen identifies the economic differences 
that exist along ethnic lines in North Macedonia. Although the 2004 study is outdated, 
some of the facts are based on the only two censuses that are available for North 
Macedonia: 1994 and 2002.288 Johansen argues that “[b]cause ethnicity in Macedonia is 
highly associated with municipal boundaries, it is appropriate to compare demographic 
and economic characteristics in municipalities, with the expectation that the most distinct 
differences will be found along the Albanian versus Macedonian divide.”289 Johansen 
realizes that unemployment rates are difficult to categorize by ethnicity within each 
municipality; however, general figures show that, by 2004, municipalities with ethnic 
Macedonians had 24.5 % unemployment, followed by relatively mixed municipalities 
with 29% unemployment, ethnic Albanian majority with 37% unemployment, and finally 
Turkish ethnic majority areas with 45% unemployment.290  
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In regard to educational attainment, Johansen also identifies that ethnic 
Macedonian municipalities show a higher rate of attending university, followed by mixed 
ethnic municipalities, majority ethnic Albanian municipalities, and then majority Turkish 
municipalities.291 In fact, since independence in 1991, education has been a highly 
divisive political matter between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians.292 Albanian 
language education in Skopje University was removed from the curriculum following 
independence, including the department of education that prepared primary and 
secondary education level teachers in the Albanian language.293 In 1994, elite ethnic 
Albanians opened the Tetovo University to provide opportunities for university education 
for Albanians; however, the central government in Skopje declared it illegal.294 This 
further added more strain to already deteriorating relations between both ethnic groups. 
While the post-OFA government policies have improved education and provided better 
access for minorities, challenges persist in regard to improving quality in general.295 In 
particular, ethnic minorities, apart from being stymied from pursuing education in their 
ethnic language, also receive basic and low quality education in the Macedonian 
language. Lack of communication skills in Macedonian has had and continues to have 
effects also in the socio-economic standing of minorities, as they cannot compete 
effectively in the labor market.296   
Ethnic marginalization, as demonstrated by political and socio-economic 
differences in North Macedonia, is a key cause of crime, political and ethnic 
radicalization, and violence. Ethnic and socio-economic marginalization, however, do not 
provide a strong causal explanation for Islamic radicalization in particular. Nonetheless, 
ethnic, cultural, political, and socio-economic cleavages provide opportunities for 
religious players to promote ideological radicalization and, later, violent behavioral 
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radicalization among ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia. First, however, it is 
important to understand how Salafism, a fundamentalist and radical interpretation of 
Islam, has proliferated in the country.  
2. Mobilization of Religious Resources 
Several religious resources have helped to spread extremism in North Macedonia. 
Christopher Deliso, for example, identifies various charities and NGOs, such as the IIRO 
or others tied to the Saudi High Commission for Relief of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
(SHC), who attempted to open similar branches in Macedonia after establishing a 
foothold in Tirana, Albania, in the early 1990s. He asserts, however, that political and 
security authorities of North Macedonia were more suspicious of these organizations and 
were less welcoming when compared to the political elite of Albania.297 Nonetheless, 
despite the bureaucratic obstacles, some of these channeled funding and support through 
the Islamic Community of Macedonia (IVZ).298 More importantly, these religious-based 
NGOs from Persian Gulf countries found favorable conditions to extend humanitarian aid 
and establish local offices in Macedonia during the 1999 Kosovo War, a war that caused 
thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo to seek refuge among their ethnic 
cohorts in North and North West Macedonia, as well as in Albania proper.299  
Deliso argues that besides humanitarian help and aid, these charities and NGOs 
began to create the infrastructure and networks for religious proliferation of radical 
interpretations of Islam, such as Salafism. Additionally, Deliso quotes a high official in 
the intelligence services of North Macedonia who stated that support was also extended 
in the form of allowing the best students from some of the country’s religious schools, or 
madrassas, to be sent for higher education in Muslim countries in the Persian Gulf, 
including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Qatar, and Yemen.300 The official also claimed 
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that “…when [the support] started, this meant only seven or eight [students] a year, but 
the number increased. These young people, trained in the foreign style of Islam, returned 
to Macedonia and began to spread that influence here.”301  
Along with ideological radicalization, violent activities of Salafists have occurred 
on numerous occasions. These various violent actions have ranged from intimidation to 
the use of force, including with firearms, to establishing radical leaders and clerics as 
imams in mosques and madrassas throughout the country, including in Skopje, the 
capital city.302 Deliso, by corroborating various official and local sources, asserts that the 
mufti of Skopje, Zenun Berisha, has been crucial in empowering some of the Salafist 
groups to gain a foothold within the IVZ but also to be violently involved in the early 
2000s.303 Additionally, European terrorist expert Claude Moniquet, in an interview for a 
Macedonian newspaper, claimed that “[w]hat some intelligence services in Europe are 
saying is that Mr. Berisha, like other people in Western and Eastern Europe, is playing 
the game of the Saudis, the fundamentalist Islam in the Balkans.” He continues to say 
that “[this] doesn’t mean that Mr. Berisha is a terrorist, or is linked to terrorists. That 
means that he tries for personal reasons, religious reasons, to promote very radical Islam 
in Macedonia.”304 Nonetheless, these claims came during the 2005–2006 period when 
the moderate leadership of the IVZ attempted to replace the Skopje mufti Berisha with 
another muftia move that some Salafists who supported Berisha did not approve of, 
and responded with violence. Yet, in IVZ elections at the beginning of 2006, the mufti 
Berisha was replaced with a more moderate mufti and the Salafi movement lost 
considerable access to resources and official power in the IVZ.305  
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Despite these setbacks, Deliso writes that the Salafists have continued to increase 
their influencemainly in Skopje, but also throughout the Muslim communities in the 
country. They did so by creating “parallel structures” for both ideological proselytization 
and also for fundraising, including local activities and local charities. Specifically, they 
raised money from private for-profit enterprises, but also from foreign Muslim countries 
and their respective foreign charitable organizations.306 The extent of their influence and 
control is demonstrated in the 2010 public request by the top cleric of the IVZ, reis-
ulemma Rexhep Sulejmani, for the government of Macedonia and the international 
communityspecifically the U.S. Embassy and the EUto support the IVZ and take 
necessary measures against radical groups.307 Moreover, the head of the IVZ also stated 
that various mosques in Skopje were under the control of radical imams who adhere to 
Salafism and were virtually beyond the control of the IVZ.308  
Several mosques in particular have turned to Salafism, increasing the likelihood 
of cognitive radicalization in these neighborhoods. In particular, the Jahja Pasha and 
Tutunsuz Mosques in Skopje, in Cair and Gazi Baba municipalities respectively, were 
among the various mosques under Salafi control and outside IVZ influence; however, 
they were returned to IVZ control after the counterterrorism “Cell” operations in the 
2015–2016 period.309  
Extreme imams are another source of radicalization. The imam Rexhep Memishi, 
credited with the radicalization and recruitment of several foreign fighters from the 
municipalities of Cair and Gazi Baba in Skopje, regularly preached in both the Jahja 
Pasha and Tutunsuz mosques.310 Additionally, Qehaja and Perteshi identify another 
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radical imam, Shukri Aliu, alongside Memishi, as having played a key role in the violent 
radicalization of many ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and also in Kosovo.311 Their 
religious studies in Saudi Arabia and Egypt can explain both imams’ radical orientation 
towards jihadist Salafism. Qehaja and Perteshi, mention that both Memishi and Aliu were 
dismissed from higher religious education in Saudi Arabia because of their takfiri 
orientation, or the practice of excommunicating fellow Muslims and, at its most extreme, 
killing them.312 Additionally, before returning to their home country from Saudi Arabia, 
they both spent several years in Egypt, where they associated with radical Salafi 
circles.313 Furthermore, Aliu was a key protagonist, or possible organizer, of many 
instances of violent acts aimed at taking control of the IVZ during the early 2000s.314 
After these incidents, he went to Kosovo and remained there until 2012 when Kosovo 
authorities, at the request of their counterparts from North Macedonia, extradited Aliu to 
face charges for those acts. Additionally, Qehaja and Perteshi note that both Memishi and 
Aliu have continually preached in Kosovo, near the border with North Macedonia. More 
specifically, they have lectured in the hometowns of Lavderim Muhaxheri and Ridvan 
Haqifi. They are credited as being two ethnic Albanian foreign fighters who became key 
leaders in ISIS and who influenced the travel to ISIS of many ethnic Albanian foreign 
fighters in the Balkans.315  
Another factor that might have contributed to the ideological and violent 
behavioral radicalization of some ethnic Albanians, especially the younger generation of 
foreign fighters, are friendship ties and group dynamics. Stojkovski and Kalajdziovski, 
from their fieldwork and interviews in the Cair municipality, found that ideological 
radicalization in general but also violent radicalization in particular is most evident 
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among “similar friend groups and neighborhoods.”316 Similarly, Vasko Sutarov identifies 
that “some [foreign fighters] lived on the same street, near the Jahja Pasha and Tutunsuz 
mosques in Cair, and knew each other and were influenced and recruited in the same 
manner.”317  
3. Global Jihad and ISIS Propaganda  
Online media and communication platforms have also played an important role in 
spreading and promoting radical Salafi ideology in general, but also in supporting and 
disseminating the propaganda narratives of ISIS and other transnational violent extremist 
groups in particular. The case of the 18-year-old girl from Kumanovo, whose personal 
computer had radical religious content and propaganda videos from the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq, suggests that online propaganda might have strengthened her decision to travel 
to ISIS. Yet, this single evidence is circumstantial and does not effectively establish 
causation between propaganda and decision to travel and join ISIS. In general, however, 
online propaganda originating from ISIS in the Albanian language might have 
strengthened radical imams’ narratives and further catalyzed individuals or group to join 
ISIS.  
Vese Kelmendi and Shpat Balaj, researchers at the Kosovar Center for Security 
Studies, collected and analyzed online content in the Albanian language from various 
platforms and social media from December 2016 to May 2017, including the profiles of 
four arrested radical imams on terrorism charges from North Macedonia, Kosovo, and 
Albania. The authors identify relatively large numbers of followers, ranging from a little 
over 2,500 Facebook followers for the radical imam Balla from Albania, to just under 
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18,000 followers for the radical imam Memishi from North Macedonia.318 Additionally, 
the authors study various other religious websites and classify the content and messages 
in three broad categories: “(i) extremist groups that are pro-violence; (ii) propaganda 
material, such as calls for jihad or support for imprisoned imams; and (iii) trends and 
attitudes towards the state, institutions and society in general.”319  
The details that the authors provide show that online narratives and content in the 
Albanian language build off of the four broad ISIS propaganda narratives identified in the 
Kosovo and Albania chapters (Chapter III and IV, respectively). Briefly, these themes 
are: 1) the establishment of the caliphate and its implementation of full sharia law; 2) the 
religious obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah (emigration), as well as the 
mandate to conduct jihad and achieve eternal salvation through martyrdom; 3) the 
perception that Muslims are under attack from the West; and 4) the appeal of jihadist 
adventure and brotherhood..320 Similar to both the Kosovo and Albania cases, the first 
themethe caliphate under sharia lawappeals to all Muslims in general, but also to the 
foreign fighters in particular. The second and third messages, which are built on the 
narratives and themes that focus on blaming the West and secular states as enemies of 
Islam and the Muslims, and the obligation to emigrate (hijrah) and wage jihad to protect 
Islam, appeal to those who strictly adhere to jihadist Salafism, an extremist ideology that 
justifies violence for protecting the faith. Additionally, the fourth theme builds on 
narratives that appeal to the younger generation of foreign fighters who are socially 
marginalized and seek to belong to a greater cause. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter analyzed various factors that may have caused ethnic Albanians in 
Macedonia to become radicalized and join violent extremist organizations such as ISIS. 
As the discussion has shown, several factors have caused 156 North Macedonian citizens 
(almost all of them from ethnic Albanian origins) to travel to ISIS.  
Initially, fragile political, social, and economic conditions shaped by tensions 
between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have created environments conducive 
for radicalization and extreme behavior to emerge, such as crime, political, and ethnic 
violence, but also religious radicalization and violence. Persisting domestic instability, 
along with regional conflicts in the Balkans such as the Yugoslav Wars of Secession from 
1991 to1995 and the Kosovo War in 1999, have provided opportunities for foreign 
charities and NGOs from Persian Gulf countries to establish a local presence and provide 
humanitarian support. 
Secondly, some of these charities and NGOs, especially those tied to Saudi 
Arabia, have also introduced a radical interpretation of Islam, such as Salafism, among 
the Muslim communities of North Macedonia, including among the ethnic Albanian 
minority who are predominantly Sunni Muslims and who traditionally follow the 
moderate Hanafi interpretation of Islam. In particular, some of these charities have 
provided the opportunity for young ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to travel to Arab 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to receive a religious education. This 
education, in turn, has infused individuals with extreme understandings of Islam, in 
addition to some embracing jihadist Salafism and advocating for violence as a primary 
means of protecting the faith and the faithful. Some of these new and young clerics have 
returned to North Macedonia and have continued to proselytize Salafism in general. 
Some imams, such as Shukri Aliu and Rexhep Memishi, however, have continued to 
spread a more violent version of Salafism, jihadist Salafism.  
Finally, ISIS propaganda in the Albanian language applies similarly across the 
Balkan countries with ethnic Albanian populations, including Albania, Kosovo, and 
North Macedonia. These propaganda efforts most likely have strengthened local radical 
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imams’ preaching and recruiting narratives and, as a consequence, have helped inspire 
the decision of many ethnic Albanians in North Macedonia to join ISIS. Among many 
propaganda themes and messages, four of them may have appealed to ethnic Albanians in 
North Macedonia, similar to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Albania proper. These 
themes are: 1) the establishment of the caliphate and its implementation of full sharia law 
as the only true arrangement under which Muslims can live; 2) the religious obligation to 
join the caliphate through hijrah (emigration), as well as the mandate to conduct jihad 
and achieve eternal salvation through martyrdom; 3) the perception that Muslims are 
under attack from the West; and 4) the appeal of jihadist adventure and brotherhood. It is 
important to note that because of similar linguistic, cultural, and religious identities 
across all ethnic Albanians in the Balkans, the themes and messages just mentioned apply 
equally to all ethnic Albanians who embrace radical interpretations of Islam. 
The next, and final chapter, provides a summary of the findings as well as 
acknowledges some implications and suggestions for policy development with a focus on 
preventing violent extremism at a national level for Kosovo, Albania, and North 
Macedonia, but also at a regional level in the Balkans.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis aimed to answer the following question: What factors have influenced 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia to become religiously 
radicalized and join violent extremist groups such as ISIS? To answer this question, this 
thesis began by providing a brief historical account of ethnic Albanians. Specifically, 
Chapter I provided an overview of how they came to be dispersed among several 
countries in the Balkans, specifically in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia.  
Chapter II began with a literature review on radicalization, focusing on three 
broad bodies of literature. First, the chapter outlined Ted Gurr’s Relative Deprivation 
Theory, which provides a basis for understanding sources of grievances and their role in 
explaining the emergence of ideological and violent radicalization.321 Second, the 
chapter considered Social Movement Theory, which informs how social processes, 
political opportunities, and mobilizing structures transform grievances into collective 
action that seek social and political change.322 Third, the chapter drew concepts from 
Religious Fundamentalism Theory literature, such factors that influence the rise of 
fundamentalist interpretations of religions around the world, including Islamic 
fundamentalism.323 Additionally, the chapter considered factors that influence the 
emergence of radical interpretations of Islam, such as Salafism, and justification of the 
use of violence to protect one’s faith.324 
Based on this literature, Chapter II then presented a radicalization model designed 
to investigate the various socio-economic, political, and religious factors that may 
contribute to ideological radicalization in general and violent radicalization in particular 
among ethnic Albanians. Specifically, the radicalization model focuses on various 
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political and socio-economic factors, including unemployment and education, as sources 
of discontent and grievances that may create favorable settings for ideological 
radicalization and violent behavior to emerge. Second, the model proposes investigating 
the role of foreign charities and NGOs, specifically those with ties to Persian Gulf 
countries, as entities that could be spreading radical interpretations of Islam, particularly 
Salafism. Third, the model proposes investigating the role of radical Islamic clerics, 
kinship relations, online recruitment, and ISIS propaganda as factors that have 
contributed to violent radicalization and recruitment for ISIS in particular. These three 
sets of variables—socio-economic conditions, NGOs and charities with ties to Persian 
Gulf countries, and social connections and propaganda—make up the proposed 
radicalization model.  
Chapters III, IV, and V then used this model to analyze the rise of ideological and 
violent radicalization among ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia 
and, specifically, to investigate those who have joined ISIS. The chapters drew data and 
evidence from reports, databases, national censuses, policy papers, journal articles, 
secondary literature, and online information from various governmental and non-
governmental organizations.  
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
This investigation yielded several key findings. First, evidence from official 
government sources and independent reports revealed that, since the start of Syrian civil 
war in 2011, 358 Albanians from Kosovo, 150 Albanians from Albania, and 156 
Albanians from North Macedonia joined ISIS.325 These numbers were measured 
according to the Muslim population for each country and the results showed that Albania 
had a foreign fighter recruitment rate of nine foreign fighters per 100,000 Muslim 
citizens, Kosovo had a recruitment rate of 21 foreign fighters per 100,000 Muslim 
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citizens, and North Macedonia had a recruitment rate of 23 foreign fighters per 100,000 
Muslim citizens.326 In other words, North Macedonia had the highest rate of foreign 
fighters per its Muslim population. 
The relatively high recruitment rates for North Macedonia and Kosovo, which are 
approximately two times the recruitment rate of Albania, indicate that North Macedonia 
and Kosovo are at a higher risk of recruitment than their neighbors. This does not 
suggest, however, that Albania is not at risk. Furthermore, demographic analysis of the 
foreign fighters for each country, based on limited data from official and other sources, 
showed that foreign fighter recruitment occurred throughout each country, and included a 
mix of individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds, different age groups, and 
different genders, as well as entire families had joined ISIS. Therefore, no single factor 
explains the path to violent radicalization and the decision of some ethnic Albanians to 
join ISIS. This finding begs the question: what accounts for these rates of recruitment? 
The investigation into the causes of radicalization and recruitment in Kosovo, 
Albania, and North Macedonia did point to some possible causal factors. First regional 
conflicts may have contributed to the radicalization process in certain countries. The 
violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, especially the Bosnian War of 1992–1995 and the 
1999 Kosovo war, provided the opportunity for various Islamic NGOs and charities from 
Persian Gulf countries to establish footholds in these war-torn countries.327 As discussed 
in Chapter IV, during these conflicts some NGOs and charities channeled money for 
terrorist activities, falsified identification documents, provided wages and sanctuary for 
jihadist militants from the Middle East, and supported terrorist activities within the 
Western Balkans.328 All of this was done under the guise of providing humanitarian aid 
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and developmental assistance. For example as discussed in Chapter IV, Islamic charities, 
such as IIRO, al-Haramein, and al Muwafaq, were found to have ties to or to be directly 
involved with terrorism.329 Following the 9/11 attacks, and with the help of the U.S. 
government, most of these charities were shut down, financial assets were frozen, and 
key individuals were arrested and deported to their respective countries.330 Nonetheless, 
the presence of these fake charities and their focus on aiding militant jihadists introduced 
jihadi Salafism to the region.  
Alongside these charities that support terrorism, other legitimate humanitarian 
organizations and charities have continued to operate in the Western Balkans, including 
in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. They have provided infrastructure building, 
education, and other social services within communities where these countries’ central 
governments have failed to address socio-economic grievances effectively. Critically, 
these charities have facilitated the proliferation of radical interpretations of Islam, 
especially Salafism. As described in Chapter IV, the Islamic Development Bank and the 
Albanian-Islamic Bank have made possible various developmental investments in areas 
such as religious infrastructure and education. These projects have helped introduce 
Salafism throughout the countries studied, which began the process of radicalization.  
Perhaps more importantly, as discussed in Chapters III, IV, and V, these charities 
have provided scholarships for higher theological education in Arab countries, including 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for many Albanians. After finishing their religious studies, these 
young clerics have returned to preach radical interpretations of Islam.331 Nevertheless, 
accepting radical ideology, such as Salafism, does not fully explain why some ethnic 
Albanians choose to join violent extremist groups while many others do not. As discussed 
in Chapter V, in Kosovo and North Macedonia, the role of radical religious clerics, such 
as Rexhep Memishi and Shukri Aliu, and their close connection with other radical clerics 
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in Kosovo, provide an important link between radicalization and the relatively high 
recruitment rates for both these countries. Their influence helps explain the high 
concentration of foreign fighters in specific communities where they have preached and 
created close networks of radical believersmostly along the border with Kosovo. 
Similarly, in the case of Albania, the role of the radical imam Almir Daci, who preached 
in three villages in the southeast of Albania until he traveled to Syria to join ISIS, helps 
explain the relatively high numbers of foreign fighters from this specific area.  
Personal relationships, specifically family and friendships, have also contributed 
to the decision of individuals to join ISIS. This is more evident in the case of Kosovo, 
where a family of ten individuals composed of three brothers, with their wives and 
children, traveled as one family to ISIS in September 2014.332 Similarly, two younger 
brothers of the notorious ISIS foreign fighter from Kosovo, Ridvan Haqifi, also joined 
ISIS.333 Instances of families and friends traveling together as a group to join ISIS are 
also evident from Albania and North Macedonia, although to a lesser extent than the 
Kosovo case.  
Lastly, ISIS propaganda and online radicalization are also important for 
considering sources of radicalization among Albanians. ISIS propaganda, which included 
messages in the Albanian language, may explain at least one case of ideological and 
violent radicalization in the countries studied. As described in Chapter V, an 18-year-old 
girl from Kumanovo, North Macedonia, joined ISIS, and her personal computer 
contained propaganda videos from Syria and Iraq.334 No sufficient evidence was 
available, however, to establish with certainty a direct causal relationship between online 
propaganda and decisions of ethnic Albanians to join ISIS. Generally speaking, though, 
ISIS propaganda might have strengthened local radical imams’ recruitment narratives 
and, as a consequence, have influenced the decision of many ethnic Albanians from these 
three countries to join ISIS. Among ISIS’s various messages, four broad themes were 
                                                 
332Zëri, “Familja dhjete anetareshe ne ISIS” (10-member family in ISIS),  
333Koha, “Prinderit e ‘Shehideve’ shqiptare te ISIS ne pikellim dhe te braktisur” (Family of Albanian 
ISIS ‘martyrs,’ in sorrow and forgotten).  
334Selimi and Stojkovski, “Assessment of Macedonia’s Efforts in Countering Violent Extremism,” 24. 
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presented: 1) the establishment of the caliphate and its implementation of full sharia law, 
2) the religious obligation to join the caliphate through hijrah (emigration), conduct jihad, 
and achieve eternal salvation through martyrdom, 3) the perception that Muslims are 
under attack from the West, 4) and the appeal of jihadist adventure and brotherhood.335 
These messages are general and broad but, when coupled with specific messages from 
local clerics, or encouragement from personal ties, may help explain the radicalization 
process among Albanians and their willingness to join ISIS.  
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Between 2014 and 2015, the governments of Albania, Kosovo, and North 
Macedonia all updated their counterterrorism laws and began conducting 
counterterrorism operations to foil radicalization and recruitment networks responsible 
for supplying foreign fighters to ISIS. Albania and North Macedonia specifically arrested 
and sentenced individuals, including radical imams, believed to be involved in calls for 
jihad and ISIS recruitment in particular. Kosovo also sentenced radical imams and 
individuals directly implicated in recruiting Kosovo Albanians to join ISIS. However, 
contrary to Albania and Macedonia, Kosovo authorities additionally arrested as many as 
80 individuals, including 13 imams, most of whom were not directly tied to calls for jihad 
or recruiting for ISIS.336 Most of these individuals, including the imams, were released 
because of lack of evidence and showed that, without robust evidence, these arrests could 
be counterproductive. Specifically, they could be construed as the government attacking 
certain groups without due cause, alienating those members. More importantly such steps 
might alienate nonviolent radical imams and their close circles of believers from the 
government and the rest of society.  
In addition to specific counterterrorism policies, each country also introduced 
national strategies for countering and preventing violent extremism more broadly. In 
particular, Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia followed the 2015 request of the UN 
                                                 
335Gartenstein-Ross et al., “The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy,” 5−6. 
336Kursani, Report inquiring into the causes and consequences of Kosovo’s citizens’ involvement as 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, 29.  
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Secretary General to develop and implement national plans of action aimed at preventing 
violent extremism.337  
Albania, in particular, has been recognized for developing a CVE Strategy and 
Plan of Action in line with international frameworks for addressing violent extremism, 
including the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the 
Global Counterterrorism Forum, and best practices from countries such as the United 
States.338 Specifically, Albania’s National CVE Strategy and Plan of Action delineates 
specific duties and responsibilities at the ministerial level, emphasizes the role and 
importance of civil society in the CVE efforts, and plans to address various socio-
economic factors, including education and employment, countering extremist 
propaganda, and focusing all CVE efforts and engagements at the local community 
level.339 While this is clearly an important start and approach, the challenges of 
addressing radicalization and violent extremism are numerous. The following are some 
recommendations that each country could consider.  
1. Governments should include all religious communities, local community 
leadership, and families as key players in CVE efforts. Families and 
friends are the first to identify possible elements of radical behavior within 
the family, friend, and close community circles. This bottom-up approach 
is critical, since there is no single pathway to violent radicalization. At the 
same time, however, families and communities need to be better educated 
on how to identify indicators of radical behavior and what resources at the 
community level are available to address this threat.  
 
2. Governments should help their respective Muslim Community 
Associations, as the official and legitimate religious organizing bodies, to 
take administrative control of mosques that they claim to be outside their 
control and under the influence of violent radical imams and clerics. This 
action will prevent radical clerics, who directly and openly advocate for 
                                                 
337Peter R. Newman, Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, 
Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region, (London: International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization (ICSR), King’s College, 28 September 2017). 47–48, https://www.osce.org/
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338Newman, Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorims, 47. 
339The Albanian Government, “VKM Nr. 930 , date 18.11.2015,” Qendra e Botimeve zyrtare (Center 
for Official Publications), accessed 2 March 2019, http://botimezyrtare.gov.al/botime/fletore_zyrtare/2015/
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resorting to violence and extremist behavior, to preach in places of 
worship where large numbers of believers attend and are influenced.  
 
3. Governments should increase opportunities and help provide 
accountability of the Muslim Community Associations for centralizing 
financial resources and donations. This will increase transparency and 
better management of finances for wages, infrastructure building, religious 
education, and other religious matters. More importantly, foreign funds 
and donations should not go directly to local NGOs but through 
government channels for checking compliance with laws on financing 
terrorism and money laundering. The Al Haramein and Muwafaq 
foundations, directly tied to terrorism activities, were among some of the 
charities that took advantage of lax laws and regulations to illegally 
channel money and harbor suspected terrorists in the 1990s. Albania, in 
fact, adopted and improved money laundering and terrorism financing 
laws in 2008, North Macedonia in 2014, and lastly Kosovo in 2016.340 
This policy prevents dubious foreign charities and radical clerics from 
managing their own finances and projects and utilizes foreign funds that 
could otherwise be used for hidden agendas.  
 
4. Muslim Community Associations should be allowed to control the 
religious education system, including curricula, licensing of religious 
teachers and imams, and any other matters that involve theological 
education. Additionally, the Muslim Community Associations should have 
oversight for and control over private institutions that provide religious 
education in order to ensure compliance with official religious teachings 
and national education laws.  
 
5. The official Muslim community should do a better job creating and 
managing online and social media platforms to provide alternative sources 
of online information of religious materials that conform with traditional 
interpretations of Islam.  
 
6. The government should better coordinate, facilitate, and lead the efforts of 
Western NGOs that provide social and developmental assistance to 
communities at risk. Priority should be given to communities who are 
                                                 
340Government of Republic of Albania, “Law on Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism 
Financing Nr. 9917, date 19.5.2008, changed to law nr. 10391 date 3.3.2011,” accessed 8 May 2019, 
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identified as high risk, such as youth, rural areas of the country, and 
underdeveloped suburban areas in major cities.  
 
7. Security and intelligence agencies charged with counterterrorism policing 
must be able to differentiate between fundamental interpretations of Islam 
and violent extremist ideologies. This implies either educating security 
and intelligence personnel on the subject, or having subject matter experts 
on religion, radicalization, and violent extremism as consultants.  
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
The thesis has identified several areas that need further research in order to better 
understand the radicalization of Albanians in the Balkans and individuals who join ISIS. 
First, a lack of demographic and socio-economic data of foreign fighters at the individual 
level hinders an accurate assessment of the sources of grievances at the individual level 
and their potential link to radicalization in general and violent radicalization in particular. 
This is especially true for Albania and North Macedonia foreign fighters. In the case of 
Kosovo, however, detailed demographics were available for 334 out of 358 foreign 
fighters.341 Additionally, in the case of Kosovo, general socio-economic data were 
presented for 54 out of 358 foreign fighters. While a sample size of 54 individuals is a 
relatively small number, it is significant when compared to no available socio-economic 
data in the case of foreign fighters from Albania and North Macedonia. Thus, more 
rigorous research and fieldwork is necessary to collect and obtain data at the individual 
level for foreign fighters from each country, especially in the case of Albania and North 
Macedonia. This critical information will allow researchers to investigate individuals’ 
motivations and their potential role in ideological and violent radicalization.  
Further research is also needed on the role that online propaganda plays in the 
radicalization process. Specifically, the thesis explored the role of ISIS propaganda in the 
Albanian language as a potential source of violent radicalization and recruitment of some 
ethnic Albanians. Apart from one possible case, no other evidence was found to suggest a 
direct causal link between online propaganda, radicalization, and recruitment to ISIS. 
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Overall, this potential source of radicalization and recruitment of foreign fighters 
originating from Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia is currently understudied. Two 
studies published in 2017 provide important insights for understanding the role of social 
media and online platforms in the dissemination of radical religious messages and 
content, including ISIS propaganda themes and messages.342 Nonetheless, these studies 
explain the dissemination and circulation of radical religious content in general and do 
not focus on foreign fighters specifically. An accurate study would require interviews 
with foreign fighters who are already in prison, and also their respective families.  
Finally, more research is needed to better understand the radicalization of ethnic 
Albanians in the diaspora. A 2018 news article from the news agency Balkan Insight 
identifies that ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia have also 
been radicalized and joined ISIS from the Albanian diaspora communities in Italy.343 
Such a follow-on study is important for understanding the extent of the relationship 
between the radical networks in the diaspora and the home countries in regard to financial 
links, logistics, and also ideological influence.  
  
                                                 
342Kelmendi and Balaj, New Battlegrounds, 18; Garentina Kraja The Islamic State Narrative in 
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